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1. Introduction 
 
Why has military force failed to quell the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan? This 
question has been the topic of numerous public debates; it has been widely discussed 
in the media, in the foreign policy and military arenas, as well as in the academic 
community. While some argue that the use of force has largely been ineffective due to 
the under-resourced military campaign, others point out that “bullets and bombs 
alone”1 are unlikely to compel the insurgents to comply with the peace process set out 
at the Bonn Conference in 2001, and emphasize the importance of civilian efforts, 
such as statebuilding2, for a lasting and credible peace. 
 
Eight years after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, life in Afghanistan is pervaded 
by the basic lack of security. Despite increasing military presence, the security 
situation has progressively deteriorated: the insurgency has intensified and spread. The 
number of security incidents3 has increased from 508 in 2003 to 6,286 at the end of 
July 2009 (UN SC 2008/782). There has been an average of 898 security incidents a 
month in 2009, as compared to 677 in 2008 (UNA/64/364–S/2009/475), resulting in 
over 1000 civilian casualties, which is an increase of 24 percent (UN News Centre). 
As security has deteriorated both the Afghans and western public opinion have 
become increasingly sceptical that the international military coalition can defeat the 
Taliban (Cooper 2009; Rubin 2009a). 
1.1.  Research Question 
Coercion, including the use of force, is said to be the most appropriate strategy in 
dealing with the Taliban-type peace spoilers (Stedman 1997: 12). For the use of force 
to be effective, international assistance may be crucial because it compensates for                                                         
1 The metaphor is taken from President Obama’s speech on a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on 
March 27, 2009. 
2 Statebuilding may be defined as “the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing 
ones” (Fukuyama 2004).  
3 The United Nations Department of Safety and Security counts as security incidents armed clashes, abductions, 
improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks. 
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weak local capacities (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Stedman 1997). However, in 
Afghanistan internationally led military operations have failed to reduce the 
insurgents’ capacity to spoil the peace.  
Is force an effective tool against the insurgency4, and if so, under what conditions? 
This study aims to examine why international security actors, in particular the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), have failed to defeat the 
insurgency in Afghanistan. More specifically, the purpose of this thesis is to attempt to 
establish a set of conditions under which the threat or use of force might be effective 
against the insurgents who disrupt the peace in Afghanistan. Hence the research 
questions are as follows: 
1) What are the conditions, if any, under which the threat of force might deter the 
Taliban from spoiling the peace?  
2) What are the conditions, if any, under which the Taliban might yield to the use 
of force? 
 
Peace here refers to the peace stipulated by the Bonn agreement of 2001. This peace 
agreement is considered “ not conventional” since it excluded the defeated party – the 
Taliban, and had no provisions for integrating the Taliban or the populations 
associated with it (Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand 2004:3-4).  
 
In order to examine the conditions under which the threat or use of force may be 
effective against the Taliban-led insurgency, I adapt the game-theoretic model 
developed by Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz (2005) to explain the conditions under which 
imposed sanctions work. Thus, the research project aims to meet two criteria King, 
Keohane and Verba (1994) stipulate for research in social science: (i) it attempts to 
understand an important problem in the real world; and (ii) it attempts to contribute to 
the scholarly literature by showing that theory “designed for some purpose in one 
                                                        
4 For the purpose of this thesis, the following definition of insurgency would suffice: insurgency is an organised, 
protracted political-military struggle aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government (FM 3-24: 1-1). 
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literature could be applied in another literature to solve an existing but apparently 
unrelated problem” (ibid: 17). 
Before I proceed to explain how I approach the specified research questions I briefly 
survey the literature on the insurgency in Afghanistan to establish the “state of the art”. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
The literature on the present insurgency in Afghanistan includes academic articles, 
reports and policy recommendations.5 I find most of this literature to reflect trends of 
the research on insurgency in general, and to confirm its main findings. Therefore I 
choose to structure this section as follows: first, I outline the main political science 
studies’ findings on insurgency; and second, on the basis of it I review a body of 
literature which attempts to answer why it has been remarkably difficult to end the 
insurgency in Afghanistan. 
 
Insurgency is more likely to occur if a set of favourable conditions is in place. These 
include poverty, political instability, rough terrain and large populations (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003). Poverty favours insurgency for several reasons. First, poverty facilitates 
insurgent recruitment because economic alternatives are grim (Collier 2000: 94; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003: 80). Second, poverty favours insurgency because effective 
counterinsurgency presupposes political, military and organisational resources which 
poor states lack. If insurgents oppose a relatively weak government and military, 
without the reach into rural areas, they will have more chances to survive. Rural areas 
in poor countries usually lack infrastructure and thus provide insurgents with a shelter 
to hide from the government, as does rough terrain and large population. The access to 
a sanctuary6 is of crucial importance for insurgents because they are weak relative to a                                                         
5 Almost every international actor involved in Afghanistan produces regular reports (see for example NATO, 
UNAMA etc.). In addition, various think-tanks such as RAND Corporation, International Crisis Group etc. 
publish comprehensive reports. These reports usually conclude with policy recommendations. 
6 Sanctuary can be physical (e.g. highly inaccessible mountains, jungle, or swamp) or political (e.g. weakly 
defended border areas or border areas controlled by supportive states) (Arreguin-Toft 2001: 104).   
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government, both numerically and technologically (at least at the beginning of the 
operations) (Arreguin-Toft 2001: 104; Fearon and Laitin 2003:80).  Equally important 
is the support of a population. It provides intelligence, logistical support and 
replacement (Fearon and Laitin 2003:80). Finally, to sustain a protracted warfare, 
insurgents must have dependable sources of finance and weapons, for example the 
support from foreign states, the illicit economy (opium, coca, diamonds) etc. (Fearon 
2004: 284). Conflicts in which insurgents have access to an illicit economy, as well as 
so-called “peripheral insurgencies”, where rural guerrilla bands operate near the state’s 
borders, have, with a very few exceptions, been particularly difficult to end (ibid: 277).  
 
All these conditions are in place in Afghanistan and their interaction make the 
insurgency particularly resilient and difficult to defeat. This is the conclusion of a 
considerable body of literature. In addition, factors peculiar to Afghanistan are 
emphasized, such as the extreme religious ideology that motivates the leadership 
(Jones 2008), Pashtun nationalism (Johnson and Mason 2008; Roberts 2009), and 
exclusion of the Taliban from power sharing by the Bonn Agreement, which gave the 
leadership few options – namely, surrender or defy (Jones 2006: 111; Suhrke 
2008:220). Failure to counteract these conditions has strengthened the insurgency. In 
this respect, the failure to address the following issues has been particularly 
emphasized: (1) the weakness of the Afghan government (its inability to provide basic 
services to the population, including security, has undermined its legitimacy and 
increased the support for the insurgents, particularly in rural areas) (Hodes and Sedra 
2007; Jones 2008:16; Rubin and Hamidzada 2007: 17);  (2) the role of Pakistan (its 
support to the insurgent movement and the border areas sanctuary) (Roberts 2009: 33; 
Rubin 2007: 65; Suhrke 2008: 220); and (3) opium production, which, apart from 
financing the insurgency, has two important implications. First, drug-related 
corruption has undermined governance and increased insecurity (Goodhand 2008). 
Second, inadequate policies for curbing opium production – the eradication of poppy 
fields without offering viable alternatives to the rural population to earn a living – 
have increased the support for the insurgents who appeared as protectors of the 
population’s basic livelihood (Felhab-Brown 2009).  
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In addition to the abovementioned factors, two sets of arguments have dominated the 
body of literature that attempts to explain why the insurgency has not been defeated 
(Suhrke 2008: 214). The first set is centred on the argument that the counterinsurgency 
campaign has been under-resourced. The second set encompasses arguments that 
stress the limitations of the military approach.7 
  
According to the first perspective, the lack of counterinsurgent resources, first of all, 
low level of forces deployed to Afghanistan, explains the failure to defeat the 
insurgency. It is pointed out that a ‘light footprint’ was inadequate to deliver security 
(Rubin and Hamidzada 2007: 11); in addition, a ‘light footprint’ implied a series of 
counterproductive measures, such as a heavy air presence and related civilian 
casualties (Ayub and Kuovo 2008: 656; Roberts 2009: 40), and cooperation with local 
warlords against the Taliban and its associates (Jones 2008:26; Rubin 2007: 66). 
Along with low levels of troops, financial assistance has been among the lowest of any 
stability operation since the World War II (Jones 2006: 111). Consequently, poverty 
persists and facilitates recruitment in the context when the insurgent movement is able 
to pay its soldiers good money (Roberts 2009:31; Rubin 2007:66).  
  
The second set of arguments emphasizes the limitations of the military approach8, 
which cannot be overcome by more troops or modified tactics. On the contrary, a 
heavier military footprint reinforces these limitations, whereas aggressive military 
operations are even counterproductive (Suhrke 2007: 229). First, they escalate 
violence and drive the insurgency, because the insurgents successfully adapt (Rubin 
and Hamidzada 2007: 13; Suhrke 2007: 221). Second, they undermine stabilization 
efforts, such as promoting the authority of central government, reconstruction and 
development (Suhrke 2007: 230; Thier 2006: 468). The insurgency cannot be defeated 
by military operations only; peace and security are not possible without good                                                         
7  These two groups of arguments may overlap to a certain extent when the implications are discussed. However, 
I choose to distinguish between them for analytical purposes. 
8 I understand the term military approach, as used by Suhrke (2007: 229) to correspond to the enemy-centred 
strategy (the goal is to defeat/eliminate the enemy) I discuss in this thesis, see 3.4.2. 
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governance (Ponzio and Freeman 2007: 174). The failure to assist institution building, 
reconstruction and development contributes to the increasing pool of potential recruits 
who join the insurgent movement due to unmet expectations (Suhrke 2007: 232). 
Finally, related to this group are arguments that stress the limitations of the military 
approach and the importance of political negotiations with the insurgents (Rubin 
2009). 9 
 
In this thesis I build on both sets of arguments and examine its relevance for the failure 
of international actors to maintain security by scrutinizing the impact of the enemy-
centred strategy, which I juxtapose with the population-centred strategy. My objective 
is to capture the most relevant factors that account for the failure to defeat the 
insurgency in Afghanistan within a single framework. I find that this is feasible by 
means of game theory, which I explain in the section that follows. Since game theory, 
to my knowledge, has not been used to explain the conflict in Afghanistan, this 
approach represents something entirely new in the literature on Afghanistan.  
 
1.3.  Research Design 
In this section I explain how I approach the research question specified in section 1.1. 
First, I present the method. Second, I discuss the data I use.  
1.3.1.  Method 
The objective of this thesis is to clarify the conditions under which the threat or use of 
force applied by international security actors, ISAF in particular, against the Taliban 
are likely to be effective. To generate explanations and predictions concerning this 
issue, I model the interaction between ISAF and the Taliban and analyze it using game 
theory. In this section I briefly define game theory, outline its main underlying 
theoretical assumptions, and discuss the implications of these assumptions for my 
model.                                                         
9 The set of arguments on political negotiations with the Taliban will not be examined further. 
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Game theory can be defined as a theory of interaction among rational actors (Hovi 
2008:11). This definition explicitly states the fundamental assumption of game theory, 
that of actors making rational choice in the context of strategic interaction. This 
means that rational10 actors are assumed to: 1) act consistently with their preferences 
and beliefs, where preferences are assumed to be transitive11 and beliefs non-
contradictory (Elster 1986: 1); 2) choose the best possible among available means in 
order to achieve goals they have in a given situation (ibid.); 3) act so as to maximize 
their own interests taking into account the strategic environment, that is, the range of 
possible choices other actors have, acknowledging that the outcome for all is 
determined by the actions of all (Hovi 2008: 19). Another typical assumption of game 
theory is that actors have common knowledge about the rationality of other actors and 
the rules of the game (Gates and Humes 1997:9). ”Information is common knowledge 
if it is known to all the players, if each player knows that all the other players know it, 
if each player knows that all the other players know that all the players know it, and so 
forth ad infinitum” (Rasmusen 2007:49). The last assumption I list here is the 
assumption of a unitary actor, on which game theory relies when applied to 
international relations.   
 
To model an interaction (a game) it is necessary to specify the following elements: (1) 
a set of players that interact; (2) a set of available strategies/actions for each player; (3) 
the information players have when making a choice; (4) the potential outcomes which 
follow from different combinations of actions players have chosen; and (5) the 
preferences each player has over outcomes (Hovi 2008: 27). This is the first step in 
formal modelling; the second step is to examine how rational players’ strategies 
interact to produce possible solutions for the game (Gates and Humes 1997: 12). These 
solutions are referred to as equilibria; in this thesis I operate with two types of 
equilibria: subgame perfect equilibrium and Bayesian perfect equilibrium.  
                                                         
10 For the purpose of this thesis, I consider Elster’s ‘thin theory’ of rationality sufficient. For an introductory 
overview on the concept of rationality, see for example Chapter 2 in Hovi (2008).  
11 If it is assumed that A > B and B > C, then it follows that A > C.  
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In this thesis I construct one model. The model is dynamic, since it includes the 
situations in which one actor can observe the other actor’s move before it makes a 
decision. The model is a noncooperative game.12 In order to generate predictions about 
the conditions under which the threat and use of force may work, I analyze the model 
under different assumptions regarding the information the players have. First, I 
analyze the model under the assumption of complete information, that is, I assume that 
the players’ strategy sets and payoffs are common knowledge. Second, I assume that 
the Taliban lacks the information about ISAF’s payoffs and I model this uncertainty by 
introducing Nature13 in the model. Thus, I analyze the model under the assumption of 
incomplete information (i.e. one sided asymmetric information).  
 
Is game theory the appropriate method to analyze conflict situations, such as the one in 
Afghanistan? Kydd (2004: 346-348) argues that game theory is particularly 
meaningful when applied to security studies, first of all, because stakes are high for the 
actors involved, therefore the actors carefully consider their strategies and have strong 
preferences over outcomes. In addition, game-theoretic models focus on key elements 
in order to arrive at the underlying essence of a strategic problem (ibid: 344). On the 
other hand, models are built on simplified assumptions, such as the assumption of a 
unitary actor. When modelling the strategic interaction between actors in Afghanistan, 
I assume that pro-government forces and the insurgents, whom I refer to as ISAF and 
the Taliban respectively, are unitary actors. This is a radical simplification. ISAF alone 
consists of 42 nations and has no unified rules of engagement. In addition, I do not 
consider the efforts of other actors, such as the US-led coalition in Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the government security forces, separately, but within ISAF efforts (see 
3.3.). The same applies to the insurgents, whom I label the Taliban, although the 
insurgent movement incorporates other elements and the Taliban movement itself is 
rather complex (see 3.2.). Nevertheless, I reduce the actors to two players on the basis                                                         
12 Noncooperative game theory, in contrast to cooperative game theory, assumes that actors cannot make binding 
commitments (Rasmusen 2007: 21).  
13 “Nature is a pseudo-player who takes random actions at specified points in the game with specified 
probabilities” (Rasmusen 2007: 13). 
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of their common preferences, because I expect this simplification to generate some 
important findings. As long as the assumptions are explicit, the oversimplification 
should not be a problem, because “the greatest virtue of a good model is to make its 
own limitations apparent” (Snidal 2004: 228). Finally, the reader should bear in mind 
that the purpose of the model is not to be a comprehensive representation of the 
conflict, but to identify the most important elements of the conflict, to define them, 
and to specify the relationships among them, in order to derive logical inferences on 
the conditions under which the threat and use of force may work (Snidal 2004: 232).  
 
1.3.2. Data 
In addition to theoretical assumptions I discuss in 1.3.1, the formal model in this thesis 
is built on empirical assumptions as well. I derive empirical assumptions from three 
sources of data: secondary literature, public documents and interviews. 
 
I mostly rely on secondary sources: scholarly literature – books and articles, various 
reports released by ISAF, national defence departments, international organisations, as 
well as the media and the Internet. The reason is that the ongoing conflict entails 
restricted access to primary sources, such as official strategy documents and military 
plans. However, some are publicly available (for example, US Army Field Manual on 
counterinsurgency FM 3-24, ISAF Tactical Directives, ISAF Commander’s revised 
strategy14). In addition, I conducted nine interviews15 to complement data material. 
The idea was to collect “as much data in as many diverse contexts as possible” (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994: 24). 
 
                                                        
14 The ISAF Commander revised strategy – also known as General McChrystal’s assessment was leaked to the 
Washington Post in September 2009.  
15 Out of nine interviews, three were with Norwegian military officers who served in Afghanistan; two with 
Foreign Ministry representatives of Norway and the Netherlands with extensive experience from Afghanistan; 
two with experts (one researcher and one intelligence officer from Denmark and Norway respectively) and two 
with Afghan students who came to Norway as refugees. All of the interviews were semi-structured, in the sense 
that they were organised around broad topics with corresponding questions. 
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My research project is about an actual and ongoing conflict; therefore it is hard to 
exclude a potential negative impact the conflict may have on sources. For example, 
collected evidence may be inaccurate due to the unstable security situation, data may 
be intentionally distorted for political and military reasons, etc. Sometimes it is 
difficult to establish whether evidence is genuine, authentic (Bryman 2004: 380). The 
latter especially concerns the literature on the Taliban. However, using peer-reviewed 
journals, well-reputed newspapers and publishers, and cross-checking findings helps 
increase the credibility of the data material.  
 
Data collected through qualitative interviews may also be subject to intentional or 
unintentional distortions (for example, post hoc rationalisation mechanism) (Andersen 
2006:293). In addition, the validity of data is affected by a sampling method. In 
selecting respondents, I applied not a method of choice, but of necessity: that is, I 
resorted to convenience and snowball sampling16 to select informants. Consequently 
the sample is unrepresentative and unbalanced in the sense that it does not include all 
parties to the conflict. On the other hand, all the interviewees were knowledgeable 
about the research problem and qualified as key informants (Andersen 2006: 278).  
Nevertheless, I relied on the strategy of triangulation17 when drawing on the data 
collected through interviews.  
 
1.4. Organization of the Thesis 
The remaining parts of this thesis are organised as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 offers a brief account of the history of conflict in Afghanistan. I concentrate 
on the three most recent foreign interventions, and discuss the context that led to the                                                         
16 I applied convenience sampling to select Afghan citizens for interview and snowball sampling for the rest. 
Convenience sampling implies that interviewees were chosen simply by virtue of their accessibility; snowball 
sampling implies that I first made a contact with knowledgeable persons who recommended the interviewees and 
helped me establish contacts (Bryman 2004: 334; ibid: 100). 
17 Triangulation refers here to the use of multiple data sources, as well as to the process of cross-checking 
findings (Bryman 2004: 275).  
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rise of the Taliban. I conclude the chapter by briefly presenting the history of the 
ongoing insurgency. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the main actors in the conflict, their goals and strategies. In 
addition, I present the theoretical framework around which the discussion on the use of 
force is organised (the rationale for using force, challenges, and effectiveness). 
 
Chapter 4 and 5 examine effectiveness of the use of force in fighting the insurgency in 
Afghanistan. In Chapter 4 I present a formal model and discuss its assumptions. Then, 
I analyze the game assuming that the belligerents have complete information about all 
relevant aspects of the conflict. In chapter 5, I analyze the model under a different set 
of assumptions: the insurgents are now assumed to lack information about the type of 
military actor they are interacting with. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the main findings and concludes the thesis.  
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2. Background 
 
Afghanistan is a land-locked, mountainous country in south-central Asia18, bordered 
by the former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the 
north, Iran in the west, China in the northeast, and Pakistan in the south and east. Its 
population is estimated to 28.4 million, and composed of approximately twenty ethnic 
groups (The World Factbook). The largest ethnic group are Pashtuns (42% of the 
population), followed by Tajiks (27%), Uzbeks (9%), Hazaras (9%), etc.  Up till 
1990s, the Pashtuns had been the traditional rulers of Afghanistan. Afghans are 
Muslims: 80 % of the population are Sunni, while 10-20% are Shiites. Islam is not 
only the national religion, but also the basis of Afghan values and culture, and 
provides some sense of unity, albeit weak. The national unity was strong only under 
the threat posed by an external enemy (Ewans 2001: 6).  The state has never managed 
to establish control in the countryside, where nine-tenths of the population live with 
little outside interference (ibid: 8).  
 
If there is one overriding feature of Afghan history, it is a history of conflict. Due to its 
geographical position, Afghanistan has had a turbulent history, being subject to 
invasions and often a pawn in great power games. The objective of this chapter is to 
give a historical overview. The first part examines how the interactions between great 
powers have influenced Afghanistan and provides an account of the indigenous 
resistance to foreign occupation. The second part provides a background for the 
contemporary conflict. 
 
2.1.  The Indigenous Resistance to Foreign Occupation  
The history of invasion of the area that came to be known as Afghanistan is 
documented in the recorded history from the sixth century BC (Ewans 2001: 10).                                                         
18 Some authors refer to Afghanistan as Central, and some as Southern Asian country. According to Ewans 
(2001:2), Afghanistan is in south central Asia, since the Afghan mountain range the Hindu Kush is a part of the 
mountainous divide that separates Southern from Central Asia.  
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However, the focus of this section is on more recent history, namely the Anglo-Afghan 
Wars and the Soviet occupation of 1978, whose legacy is important for the 
understanding of the present conflict. This overview is structured so as to illustrate the 
similar pattern of great powers’ invasions that were met with fierce resistance from the 
Afghan population.   
 
2.1.1.  Great Britain and Afghanistan 
“ I have been struck with the magnitude of your resources, your ships, 
your arsenals, but what I cannot understand is why the rulers of so 
vast and flourishing an empire should have gone […] to deprive me of 
my poor and barren country” Dost Mohammed during the First 
Anglo-Afghan War (Ewans 2001: 50). 
 
Situated between British India and Russia, the nineteenth-century Afghanistan, as a 
buffer state, was caught up in power politics at cost of three Anglo-Afghan wars. The 
British considered the position of Afghanistan “the most important in Asia for the 
protection of British India” and were determined to “counteract the progress of 
Russian influence” in that country, if necessary by “interfering decidedly in [its] 
affairs […]”, as stated in 1836, in the instructions for the then Governor-General of 
India, Earl of Auckland (Ewans 2001: 37). 
 
The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) was the outcome of a direct British 
interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan when the British, by invasion, 
dethroned the then ruler Dost Mohammed and installed the more cooperative Shah 
Shuja. The British justified the invasion claiming that Dost Mohammed was “injurious 
to the security and peace of the frontiers of India”, while Shah Shuja enjoyed popular 
support (Ewans 2001: 43-44). The British troops would be withdrawn “once the shah 
is secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established” 
(ibid: 44). Critics of the invasion warned that considerable resources would be 
required to hold the Shah in power. 
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The survival of the Shah on the throne depended utterly on the British Army; at the 
same time, the very presence of the troops that installed him undermined the 
legitimacy of his rule. The Afghans regarded the Shah as the British puppet and 
resented the presence of foreign troops.  The discontent started in Kabul in 1840, was 
followed by the uprising in Kandahar and Helmand, and turned into a countrywide 
rebellion when the British reduced tribe subventions in 1841 (Ewans 2001: 48). The 
remaining British troops were unable to defend themselves and the First Anglo-
Afghan War ended in British defeat. 
 
The defeat cost the British 17-20 million pounds; the Army lost 15-20,000 soldiers 
(ibid: 52). In revenge, the British demolished the Kabul Bazaar and committed a 
massacre in the village Istalif (1842) – they killed all adult males, raped and killed 
many of the women, looted and destroyed property (ibid: 51). The Afghans – the only 
Mohammedans of the time devoid of antipathy toward the Christians – started to 
mistrust foreigners and despise them as infidels and immoral. Xenophobia, it is 
claimed, “became ingrained in the national outlook” (ibid: 52).  
 
In 1842 the British withdrew from Afghanistan, stating: “ the king we have set up has 
not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he 
has been placed” (Ewans 2001: 51). Their ensuing policy of non-interference was 
challenged by two issues: the concern with the Russian expansion and hostility of the 
Pashtun tribes. The British attempted to subdue them militarily, playing one tribe 
against another and preventing the regime in Kabul from controlling them. Such 
policies reinforced Afghan distrust of the British and complicated their relationship up 
to 1947 when the British left India (ibid: 55).  
  
The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1890) was, as much as the first one, a British 
attempt to deter what was perceived ‘Russian expansionism into a British sphere of 
influence’. The pretext for the war was the Afghan denial of the British request to 
establish a resident envoy in Kabul, on a par with the Russian. The then ruler of 
Afghanistan Sher Ali refused on the grounds that the British presence would create 
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“the fear firmly fixed in [the Afghan] minds […] that if Englishmen, or other 
Europeans, once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands” 
(Ewans 2001: 60). The government in London felt that the national prestige was at 
stake and decided to go for war.  
 
After a rapid military success, the British considered “after conquest” alternatives: a 
permanent occupation was “financially crippling”, dividing Afghanistan into 
principalities undesirable because it might lead to the instability of the region. The 
most appealing alternative was to restore friendly relations and the British negotiated    
the Treaty of Gandamak (1879) with Sher Ali’s heir, Yakub Khan, which permitted 
them to set up a permanent mission in Kabul and conduct Afghan foreign policy in 
return for a subsidy for the Amir (Ewans 2001: 63). The Treaty, however, was of no 
value. Yakub Khan’s authority was limited, as the British learned when their residence 
in Kabul was attacked. The attack triggered the British reign of terror, while the Amir 
abdicated and escaped to India (ibid: 63-65). The Afghans, by then xenophobic and 
belligerent, responded with an immediate rebellion. Mir Din Muhammad, a mullah of 
great reputation, called for jihad, which resulted in a series of uprisings, but ended in 
Afghan defeat (ibid.). However, despite their victory, the British could not afford the 
cost of the occupation and left the country in 1880 (ibid: 68).  
 
The Anglo-Afghan relations in the period between the Second and the Third Anglo-
Afghan War (1880-1919) were based on mutual compromise and largely satisfactory. 
The Afghan ruler Abdul Rahman preferred the British to Russians and accepted 
Britain as its representative in foreign affairs. In return, Britain refrained from 
interfering in Afghan internal affairs. During this period, Britain delineated the borders 
of Afghanistan with Iran, Russia and British India. This demarcation has been 
considered detrimental to Afghanistan, particularly the border with British India, the 
so-called Durand Line19, which did not take into account ethnographical and 
topographical factors and divided Pashtun tribes and villages (Misdaq 2006: 60).                                                         
19 In 1893, Sir Henry Mortimer Durrand, the British foreign secretary of India, signed an agreement with the 
Afghan ruler, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, separating Afghanistan from what was then British India. The Durrand 
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The Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) was provoked by King Amanullah’s decree in 
which he proclaimed the independence of Afghanistan, and called for jihad against the 
British having sent the army to the frontier (Ewans 2001: 87) The British, concerned 
that this might provoke the uprising of the tribes, set for the war. After a month of 
hostilities, a peace treaty “heavily weighted in the British favour” was negotiated (ibid: 
90). The British recognised Afghan independence, having compelled the Afghans to 
accept the Durand Line.   
 
The Durand Line was to cause substantial problems in the relations between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1950s-1960s. The Soviet Union used the conflict to its 
advantage to establish and strengthen its influence in Afghanistan (Ewans 2001: 108).  
 
2.1.2. The Soviet Union and Afghanistan 
Due to its location, Afghanistan continued to have strategic importance in the post-
WW2 period. After Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union set out to establish good relations 
with the Third World countries in order to counteract Western influence. Afghanistan 
was the first country they approached and, as Khrushchev stated, they were prepared 
to go to great lengths to ensure that their influence in Afghanistan was predominant 
(Ewans 2001: 134).  
 
The close Afghan-Soviet relations, especially during the premiership of Mohammed 
Daoud (1953-1963), seem to have developed out of need and not entirely in 
accordance with Afghan preferences. Namely, Afghanistan failed to approach the 
United States because the Americans considered the country strategically unimportant, 
and a potential threat to a close American ally – Pakistan. Consequently, the United 
States refused to supply Afghanistan with arms, and pushed them to the Soviets who 
provided loans for arms supplies, military training, and infrastructure. In addition, the 
Soviet Union supported Afghanistan over the issue of Pashtunistan (Ewans 2001:                                                                                                                                                                              
Line, as it became known, divided the Pashtun tribes in order to weaken them, making it easier for the British to 
pacify the region (Jones 2009: 99). 
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112). During Daoud’s premiership Afghanistan became militarily and economically 
dependent on the USSR.  
 
The liberalisation of the Afghan society in the 1960s laid the foundations for the 
establishment of the communist party PDPA, which opened new possibilities in the 
Soviet-Afghan relationship. Under the pretext of supporting the communist party, the 
Soviets interfered in the Afghan internal affairs by supporting military coups, against 
the King Zahir in 1973, and against Mohammed Daoud in 1978, after which the 
Communists came to power (Dorronsoro 2005: 85). The popular resistance to the 
brutal communist regime induced the Soviet invasion in 1979, and the occupation 
(1979-1989). 
 
The purpose of the invasion was the removal of Prime Minister Amin, who was 
regarded as the source of instability (Dorronsoro 2005: 91). Once the situation was 
stabilized, the troops would be withdrawn (Rubin 1995: 123). The Soviets justified the 
invasion as the response to “a genuine request from a duly constituted Afghan 
authority” (Ewans 2001: 147).  Others argued that the invasion was ideologically 
motivated (ibid: 142). The USSR could not allow the fall of a communist regime 
because it would have damaged its prestige, raised doubts about its ability to support 
communist regimes and led to American predominance in the region. The fact that a 
counter-revolution was taking place along the Soviet southern border further enhanced 
the concerns. However, the position of Afghanistan – “within striking distance from 
the Persian Gulf oil fields and warm water ports” – has led many to regard the 
occupation as a sign of Russian expansionism (Misdaq 2005: 155).  
 
The installation of a new regime by foreign troops provoked an immediate popular 
revolt, which turned into a nation-wide uprising. As the occupation progressed, 
Afghan groups, which opposed the regime from Pakistan, reorganised and, with 
extensive aid from the United States, Pakistan and the Arab World, played a central 
role in the resistance against the Soviets. They came to be known as the mujahidin, 
“holy warriors”, having declared jihad against the “infidels” and the Kabul regime. 
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There were seven such groups in 1980 operating in Peshawar, four of them ‘Islamist’ 
and three ‘traditionalists’.20 
 
Faced with a growing insurgency, the Soviets applied a military strategy according to 
which the Red Army was to control the key sites and major cities, while the Afghan 
Army was supposed to tackle the insurgency in the countryside. For that reason, it was 
essential for the Soviets to strengthen the Afghan Army so that it could control the 
country on its own (Dorronsoro 2005: 188). The flaws of the strategy became soon 
apparent. The Afghan Army was largely ineffective and subject to mass desertions, 
while the Red Army, trained for conventional warfare, was ill suited for a guerrilla war 
in the difficult mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The Soviets were unable to control 
the country, but for the major cities and main lines of communication, and these were 
frequently attacked as well (ibid: 189).  
 
The Soviet counterinsurgency strategy was not based on so-called ‘hearts and minds’ 
approach, but on indiscriminate use of force. The overwhelmingly superior Soviet 
military machine depopulated the countryside in the search for insurgents, by carpet-
bombing villages and ‘scorched earth’ policy (Ewans 2001: 159). The result was one 
million civilian deaths, over five million refugees, and two to three million internally 
displaced persons (Rubin 2002:1).  
 
Although the Soviet military was preponderant – between 90,000 and 150,000 fought 
in Afghanistan – it could not defeat the mujahidin21 or control the frontier toward 
Pakistan, the mujahidin main arms supply route, and ended up in a continuous 
stalemate. The question is why the Soviets did not deploy more troops. Several 
arguments have been put forward (Ewans 2001: 160). First, it seems that they realized 
that even massive troops reinforcements would be unlikely to achieve a decisive 
victory. Second, the maintenance and supply of a higher force level in such a difficult                                                         
20 The Islamists were fighting for the Islamic republic, the traditionalists for the return of the monarchy.  
21 The number of the mujahidin was estimated to 100,000; however, they were never concurrently engaged in 
resistance. 
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terrain was demanding and costly. Third, it is doubtful that the Soviets could sustain 
an even higher cost of the occupation.22 Fourth, domestic public opinion was turning 
increasingly against the war, as it became known that the number of Soviet casualties 
was high, and that the Soviet Army was perceived as an occupier instead of a helping 
hand to fellow communists.  
 
The new Soviet leadership with Gorbachev, the Party Secretary from 1985, was not 
willing to accept the prolonged stalemate, and set a deadline. The military was given 
one year to demonstrate that their strategy worked. After the ‘bloodiest year of the 
war’ and no progress, the Politburo authorised withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 
November 1986 (Rubin 1995: 146). The withdrawal started in May 1988, and ended in 
February 1989. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continued to provide support necessary 
to sustain the Kabul regime at the estimated cost of $3-4 billion per year, until its 
disintegration in 1991 (ibid: 147). With the demise of the Soviet Union, the chances of 
the regime to survive diminished and it collapsed in 1992 giving way to the mujahidin 
rule.  
 
2.1.3. The United States and Afghanistan 
The development of the US-Afghan relations was initially shaped by the Cold War 
superpower confrontation. The United States started to provide economic aid to 
Afghanistan in the 1950s to counterbalance the influence the Soviets had exerted 
through extensive military and economic assistance (Rubin 1995: 65). With the Soviet 
invasion, American assistance was directed at the mujahidin groups through which the 
United States fought a proxy war against the Soviet Union. In the early years of the 
war, American aid was discreet  – so as to “keep the Russian wound bleeding, rather 
than be a part in the mujahidin victory” (Ewans 2001:164). From 1985, according to 
the President Reagan’s directive, the US Administration was to use “all available 
means to compel the Soviet withdrawal” (ibid: 165). Supplying the mujahidin with                                                         
22 The cost of the occupation was estimated to approximately between $7 and $12 billion a year (Ewans 2001: 
161).  
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arms and aid, the United States, together with other Western states and Saudi Arabia, 
contributed to the Soviet defeat. However, with the end of the Soviet threat, American 
interest in Afghanistan diminished, whereas the mujahidin, with the Gulf War and the 
presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, turned against the United States and 
started advocating indiscriminate attacks against Americans in the name of global 
jihad (Dorronsoro 2005: 302-305).23 The alliance forged in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet occupation ended and the religious rhetoric was soon to be followed by terrorist 
attacks, planned and organised in Afghanistan, which, during the 1990s became ‘a safe 
haven for terrorists’.   
 
2.2.  The Rise of the Taliban 
The seven main mujahidin groups24 which were central in the resistance to the Soviet 
occupation in the 1980s never turned into a unified movement due to internal divisions 
and external influences. With the withdrawal of the common enemy, personal 
rivalries, ethnic, tribal and religious cleavages proved even more divisive. Instead of 
forming a viable alternative to the communist regime that collapsed in 1992 with the 
                                                        
23 The main grievances, in addition to the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, were the occupation of 
Palestine and sanctions against Iraq, as listed in Bin Laden’s fatwa of 23 February 1998. More broadly, ‘anti-
Americanism’ can be understood as the opposition to American financial, military and cultural domination 
(Dorronsoro 2005: 305). 
24 These were: (1) The Hezb-i-Islami, predominantly Pashtun Islamist group under the leadership of Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, was considered the most radical and uncompromising of all the mujahidin groups. It was a favourite 
of CIA and Pakistani civilian and military establishments. (2) The second Hezb-i-Islami, under the leadership of 
Abdul Haq, was a breakaway from Hekmatyar and supported by Pakistan and CIA. (3) The Jamiat-i-Islami, 
primarily Tajik and non-Pashtun movement, was under the leadership of Rabbani, with Ahmad Shah Massoud as 
its famous commander. The group, which was regarded as a moderate Islamist group, was supported by Iran.  (4) 
The Ittihad-i-Islami Bara-I Azadi Afghanistan, under the leadership of Abdal-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf, was 
supported by Saudi Arabia and recruited Arab volunteers. (5) The Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, headed by Maulvi 
Nabi Mohammedi, was a Pashtun traditionalist group active in Helmand province. The group was regarded as 
ineffective, corrupted and engaged in drugs trade. (6) The Mahaz-i-Melli-i-Islami, led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, 
recruited mostly among the Turkmen. It advocated the return of King Zahir, was pro-Western oriented and 
hostile to the Islamists. As a result, it was opposed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. (7) The Jabha-i-Nejat-Melli, 
led by Mujadiddi, was supported by pre-war elite and opposed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The group was 
largely ineffective as guerrilla force. In addition to the abovementioned Sunni Afghan mujahidin parties, there 
was a number of Hazara Shia parties, supported by Iran (Ewans 2001: 154-155) 
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end of the Soviet support, the mujahidin turned against each other.  Their struggle for 
power brought the country into civil war.  
The popular disillusionment with the mujahidin was a spark that led to the rise of the 
Taliban, a radical religious movement that rapidly mobilized widespread support 
across the country (Sullivan 2007: 94).  The Taliban themselves, when accounting for 
their origins, emphasize the violent mujahidin rule.25 In contrast, observers, while not 
downplaying the disappointment with the once-idealized mujahidin, claim that the rise 
of the Taliban was less spontaneous, and point out that Pakistan played a key role in its 
rise to power (Rubin 2002:xii). Pakistan supported the Taliban in belief that a Pashtun 
dominated Afghan government would be beneficial for its economy and relationship 
with India (Sullivan 2007: 104). While these factors are important, they are not 
sufficient to explain the Taliban success. Undoubtedly, the background factors – state 
failure, poor socio-economic conditions, ethnic divisions, a large number of 
disaffected young males, and the fundamentalist teachings in religious schools 
(madrasas) – provided favourable conditions for the emergence of a fundamentalist 
Islamist movement (Sullivan 2007: 94).  In addition, the religious ideology, which is a 
base of the Taliban authority, proved crucial for rapid mobilisation (ibid: 105). 
 
Appearing as an alternative to disorder, the Taliban first gained control in the south, 
the Pashtun homeland. Five years later in 1999, the Taliban controlled virtually the 
whole territory, with the exception of less than ten percent in the north.26 Its official 
goal was to unify all Afghans under an Islamic government, and to “emulate an ideal 
Muslim society” (Dorronsoro 2005: 267). For that purpose, the Taliban imposed a 
strict interpretation of the Islamic law and custom27 and established a religious police 
as a mechanism of social control (ibid.). Concurrently, the Taliban rejected political 
parties and the idea of ‘free and fair’ elections as the foundation of political                                                         
25 See, for example, Ahmad Rashid’s interviews with the Taliban leaders (Rashid 2001:22-23).  
26 This part of the country was under the control of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. 
27The following will serve as an illustration: banning television, games and music; amputating hands and feet to 
criminals; banning female employment and education; limiting female freedom of movement and enforcing 
burqa on women.  
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legitimacy, arguing, like other Islamic and fundamentalist movements, that the 
numerical majority cannot alter the Law of God (ibid: 278). The shariat28, interpreted 
by ulema29, is perceived as the only legitimate source of law.  
 
The Taliban core members were poor Pashtuns from rural areas in southern 
Afghanistan, educated in madrasas in Pakistan in the 1980s. The religious education is 
considered to be their key experience, and a source of strength and unity of the 
movement, together with the same social origin of its members (Dorronsoro 2005: 
275). Rural Pashtuns have supported the Taliban as a guarantor of their security, while 
non-Pashtuns, Shiites and urban population have opposed it from the beginning (ibid: 
278). Internationally, only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates 
recognised the regime, which was notorious for its record of human rights abuses.  
 
The Taliban became the best-known radical religious group in the world in the 
aftermath of 9/11. The regime had sheltered Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda, 
responsible for the terrorist attacks on the United States. Bin Laden’s links to 
Afghanistan can be traced back to the 1980s when he, together with many so-called 
Afghan Arabs, came to wage jihad against the Soviets with an active support of the 
United States. Then established training camps and networks with Islamic movements 
were used a decade later by bin Laden to launch his global jihad – this time against the 
United States (Dorronsoro 2005: 302).  
 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States issued an ultimatum demanding that the 
Taliban extradited Osama Bin Laden; otherwise the country would be subject to US 
attacks. The Taliban discarded the extradition, and the United States responded with 
Operation Enduring Freedom, the combat operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda 
with the objective to destroy terrorist networks. After six weeks, the Taliban regime 
collapsed and a peace settlement was negotiated under the auspices of the UN.  
                                                        
28 The code of law, based on the Koran.  
29 Islamic scholars. 
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The Afghan peace accords – the Bonn Agreement of 2001 – was a settlement between 
various groups that opposed the Taliban regime – the members of the so-called 
Northern Alliance, which emerged as the victors over the Taliban due to the superior 
US military support (Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand 2004:3). The responsibility for the 
enforcement of the settlement resided with the Afghans themselves (Bonn Agreement: 
Annex 1). However, recognizing the lack of capacity of the Afghan Interim 
Authority,30 the participants at the Bonn conference requested the UN Security 
Council to authorize “the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations 
mandated force”(ibid.). Since as early as 2001, an International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) has been deployed to Afghanistan to assist the Interim Authority, later 
on the Government, in exercising and expanding its authority throughout the country, 
in order to create the conditions for development and good governance. In 2003, 
NATO took command over ISAF31 (ISAF). 
 
However, the implementation of the Bonn peace agreement, i.e. physical and political 
reconstruction of the country has been challenged by the resurgence of the insurgency. 
The Taliban managed to regroup itself and has posed a serious threat to the peace 
efforts. Since 2003 the security situation has progressively deteriorated, the conflict 
has intensified and spread. Since 2005 ISAF has been confronted with the resilient 
insurgency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
30The Interim Authority is a provisional arrangement, established by the Bonn Agreement, pending the 
reestablishment of permanent government institutions. The purpose of the Interim Authority was to be the 
repository of Afghan sovereignty. 
31 Prior to NATO’s leadership, the command over ISAF was rotated every six month among contributing 
nations. 
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3. Spoiler Management: Coercion 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the main actors in the conflict, their goals 
and strategies, with special emphasis on the strategies international security actors 
have applied to manage threats to peace and security in Afghanistan. The discussion 
demonstrates that the international actors have opted for a strategy of coercion because 
coercion is expected to have the greatest leverage against the Taliban and its 
associates. Yet, coercion has failed to induce them to comply with the peace 
agreement. The reasons for noncompliance will be examined in the subsequent 
chapters.   
 
This chapter is divided in three sections. The first section outlines the theoretical 
framework that underpins this and subsequent chapters. The second section presents 
the main actors in the conflict, and the goals they have attempted to achieve. The third 
section presents the strategies international actors have applied to provide security. 
Finally, come concluding remarks are put forward.    
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
The greatest risk to peace comes from spoilers – actors who are dissatisfied with the 
terms of a peace agreement and act so as to prevent those terms from being 
implemented.32 Therefore, the success of a peace process depends on effective spoiler 
management. In that regard much depends on custodians – international actors 
mandated to oversee the implementation of a peace agreement – and their ability to 
devise and implement successful spoiler management strategies. These are the main 
arguments Stedman (1997) puts forward in his seminal article on spoiler problems in 
peace processes.33  In the remaining part of this section I first outline Stedman’s theory 
on successful spoiler management, focusing particularly on coercion. Second, I present                                                         
32 Please note that a spoiler may also try to prevent a peace agreement from being reached in the first place. 
While the definition I propose overlooks this, it suffices the purpose in this thesis. 
33 The theoretical framework on spoiler management is based on Stedman (1997), with the exception of the 
definition of spoiler.  
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the threat theory (Hovi 1998), around which the discussion on the effectiveness of 
coercive strategies is organised. Third, I discuss the challenges international actors 
may face in spoiler management by presenting the theory of asymmetric conflict 
(Arreguin-Toft 2001).   
 
3.1.1. Spoiler Management 
A successful spoiler management strategy is devised to match a corresponding type of 
spoiler. Spoiler management thus requires (1) a correct identification of a spoiler type; 
(2) devising an appropriate (matching) strategy; and (3) its implementation. To 
identify a spoiler type, the following issues should be examined:  
(i) Is a spoiler a party to a peace settlement, or excluded from it? Depending on its 
position vis-à-vis a peace agreement, a spoiler can be inside or outside spoiler. 
(ii) What goals do spoilers pursue? To what degree are spoilers committed to the 
achievement of their goals? Depending on the nature of their goals and 
commitment, spoilers can be limited, total, or greedy. Limited spoilers pursue 
limited goals, such as, for example, a share of power. Total spoilers pursue 
total power and have immutable preferences. Greedy spoilers’ goals expand or 
contract depending on the calculation of cost and risk.  
(iii) Does the impetus for spoiler behaviour come from the leadership or from the 
followers? If, for example, the leadership incites spoiler behaviour, the change 
in leadership may lead to a change in spoiler behaviour. 
(iv) How many spoilers threaten the peace process? The number of spoilers may 
affect the implementation of spoiler management strategies, because a strategy 
devised to neutralise one spoiler may strengthen another (Stedman 1997: 8-11). 
 
Spoiler management strategies are devised on the basis of the spoiler type. Here are 
outlined three general conceptual types of spoiler management strategies, with a 
special emphasis on coercion (ibid: 12). The strategies may be employed 
independently or jointly, simultaneously or in a sequence. These are:  
  31 
 
(i) Inducement, i.e. giving the spoiler what it wants. The most effective strategy in 
dealing with limited spoilers. 
(ii) Socialization, i.e. changing the behaviour of the spoiler so as to adhere to a set 
of established norms. The most effective strategy in dealing with greedy 
spoilers. 
(iii) Coercion, i.e. punishing spoiler’s behaviour or reducing its capacity to destroy 
a peace process. The most effective strategy in dealing with total spoilers.  
I proceed to define coercion and discuss four different coercion strategies. 
Coercion 
Coercion may be defined as a threat or use of force with the aim to deter or alter 
unacceptable spoiler behaviour, or reduce its capacity to disrupt a peace process 
(Stedman 1997: 13). It can be applied through the following strategies: (i) coercive 
diplomacy; (ii) the ‘departing train’ strategy; (iii) the withdrawal strategy; and (iv) use 
of force. The first three coercive strategies are based on threats of force, while the last 
strategy is applied only after the threat of force has failed.  
 
Coercive diplomacy entails the use of threats of force and demands, i.e. an 
international actor threatens to use force against the spoiler unless it complies, as 
NATO did against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 (Stedman 1997:13).  The ‘departing 
train’ strategy is based on threats to exclude total spoilers from a peace process. The 
strategy is based on the belief that “the peace process will irrevocably go forward, 
regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not” (ibid: 14). The ‘withdrawal strategy’ 
makes use of threats to withdraw international support and peacekeepers, provided that 
the peace spoiler wants international presence (ibid.). The strategy was successfully 
applied in Cambodia.34 The last coercive strategy – the application of force to defeat 
the spoiler – is used only when threats of force failed to cause the change in the 
spoiler’s behaviour.                                                          
34 For a case study on the use of the ‘withdrawal strategy’ in Cambodia see Stedman (1997: 26-32). 
  32 
 
Not all coercive strategies, however, are equally effective in managing total spoilers. 
For example, coercive diplomacy and the withdrawal strategy are of little use. 
Coercive diplomacy is inefficient because total spoilers are usually cost-insensitive, 
i.e. they tend to regard any threat of force as insufficiently severe.  In addition, if a 
threat of force turns out not to be credible, total spoilers will exploit the situation and 
present international actors as incapable in order to strengthen their own position. 
Equally inapplicable is the withdrawal strategy, as the threat appears not to be 
relevant: it is in accordance with total spoilers’ preferences as they usually wish 
international forces to abandon the peace process (Stedman 1997: 15).  
 
Consequently, international actors may either (i) use force to defeat the spoiler, and/or 
(ii) employ the “departing train” strategy. The use of force strategy has its limitations – 
few international actors are willing to commit themselves to defeating a total spoiler, 
as it demands time and other resources. An alternative is the departing train strategy: 
to strengthen the parties of peace so that they can defend themselves against the total 
spoiler.35 For that purpose, peacekeepers are deployed to legitimize and strengthen the 
parties of peace, whereas the spoiler is delegitimized and deprived of resources it may 
use to undermine peace (Stedman 1997: 15).  
 
Finally, it is important to note at least two issues that make spoiler management 
challenging. First, the diagnosis of a spoiler type is difficult due to the fact that issues 
such as the goals of spoilers, their commitment to the cause, the degree of the 
leadership’s control of followers and similar, are not always easy to determine (ibid: 
17). Second, an optimal strategy to manage a spoiler may be too costly or too risky for 
international actors to implement (ibid: 16).  
                                                        
35 The training of domestic security forces and security sector reform (SSR) has been an inherent part of peace 
support operations since the 1990s. This alternative requires resources as well, but they are so-called “treasure” 
rather than “blood” resources.  
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As this discussion illustrates, the potential impact of coercive strategies in spoiler 
management is directly related to the extent the threats these strategies make use of are 
effective. I proceed to discuss the threat theory. 
 
3.2.1. A Threat Theory 
First, I present the definition of the concept of a threat. Second, I put forward the 
theoretical conditions for a threat to be effective identified by Hovi (1998).  
 
The Concept of a Threat 
In this thesis, a threat is defined as a “contingent assertion signalling an intention to 
hurt somebody […] unless that somebody acts in the way prescribed by the threatener” 
(Hovi 1998: 11). It is important to note that a threat is a conditional commitment: it 
will be carried out only if the target fails to act in the way specified by the threat (ibid: 
12). In case of noncompliance, the target will be hurt, either directly or indirectly, by 
the threatener.  
 
The Conditions for a Threat to be Effective 
In order to discuss the theoretical conditions for a threat to be effective, it is essential 
to define what is meant by an effective threat. In this thesis, a behavioural definition is 
applied: a threat is deemed effective if it causes the target to change its behaviour in 
the way demanded by the threatener (Hovi 1998: 13). Under the assumption of 
complete information36, a threat, to be effective, must satisfy the following conditions: 
it has to be (1) relevant; (2) credible; (3) sufficiently severe (4) contingent and (5) 
clear37 (ibid: 13- 16). I proceed to discuss what each of the proposed criteria implies.  
                                                        
36 We speak of a game with complete information if the players have full information about the parameters, that 
is, all variables defining the game before the beginning of the game. These variables include the players’ payoff 
functions, strategies and information each player has about all of these variables (Harsanyi 1986: 90). 
37 The last criterion is redundant since I have specified the condition of complete information. Nevertheless, I 
keep it in order to reiterate its significance.  
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1. A threat is relevant if the target has (i) some freedom of action to adjust its 
behaviour in the way prescribed by the threatener, and (ii) an incentive to act 
contrary to the threatener’s desires. If the first condition is not fulfilled, a threat 
cannot have any impact on the target’s behaviour. Likewise, if the second 
condition is not met, any change in the target’s behaviour would not be caused 
by the threat. 
 
2. A threat is deemed sufficiently severe if the target prefers complying with the 
threatener’s demands to defying these demands and having the threat 
effectuated. The severity of the threat, however, depends not only on the 
magnitude of the threatened punishment, but also on the character of the 
demands made by the threatener. Even a very severe threat may turn out to be 
ineffective if the threatener’s demands have a bearing on the target’s vital 
interests.  
 
3. A threat is considered credible if it is in the threatener’ s interest to carry out the 
threat in case the target does not comply. If the target recognizes that the 
threatener has incentives not to carry out the threat in case of transgression, the 
threat cannot be credible. 
 
4. A threat is contingent if it is followed by an explicit promise that it will not be 
effectuated in case of compliance. If the target believes that the threat will be 
put into effect regardless of whether it complies or not, the threat cannot be 
effective because the target has no incentive to comply.  
 
5. For a threat to be sufficiently clear the target must understand what the 
threatener requires and what the consequences of noncompliance are.  
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3.2.2. A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict 
The objective of this section is to discuss the challenges international actors may 
encounter when applying force to manage a total spoiler. Here I examine the 
conditions under which an overwhelmingly stronger actor cannot defeat its 
substantially weaker adversary.38 For that purpose I introduce the strategic interaction 
thesis39 (Arreguin-Toft 2001), which provides a general explanation of asymmetric 
conflicts’ outcomes. This theory argues that strong actors are likely to lose asymmetric 
conflicts despite their overwhelming power advantage if they apply a wrong 
counterstrategy vis-à-vis their opponents’ strategy (ibid: 95).  
 
The strategic interaction thesis assumes that any strategy can be categorised as one of 
two ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and indirect, where direct approaches target 
an adversary’s capacity to fight (i.e. its armed forces), and indirect approaches target 
its will to fight.40 Same-approach interactions (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) favour 
strong actors who accomplish victory quickly and decisively. By contrast, opposite 
approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) make power advantage 
irrelevant and imply failure for strong actors in a protracted conflict (ibid: 105). How 
do stronger actors lose? First of all, strong actors are likely to be overconfident: they 
tend to overestimate the prospect of quick and decisive victory. Therefore, in the 
context of a protracted conflict, they are likely to make mistakes in order to meet the 
expectations: they either escalate force (and hence the costs of a conflict) or employ 
                                                        
38 Arreguin-Toft (2001: 94) defines strong actors as belligerents whose military power is at least ten times the 
power of their adversary. The material power refers to the product of a given party’ population and armed forces. 
Note that “strong” and “weak” have meaning only in a particular dyadic context. 
39 Arreguin-Toft’s usage of the term strategic interaction does not correspond to the usage of strategic 
interaction in formal models, as explained in 1.3.1. It refers to the traditional usage of strategy in strategic 
studies, that is, a strategy refers to an actor’s plan for using armed forces to achieve military or political 
objectives (Arreguin-Toft 2001: 99).  
40 The examples of direct strategies are: (1) direct attack (including blitzkrieg) and (2) direct defence. The 
examples of indirect strategies are (1) barbarism and (2) guerrilla warfare strategy (Arreguin-Toft 2001: 100). 
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barbarism.41 Both approaches imply political costs and result in domestic pressure to 
withdraw, despite the military situation on the ground (ibid: 106).  
 
It is important to note that actors cannot arbitrarily choose an ideal counterstrategy in 
an armed conflict and thus secure victory (ibid: 106-107). The forces trained and 
equipped for applying direct strategies cannot easily turn to indirect strategies, and 
vice versa, irregular armed forces cannot operate as regular. This is because 
manpower, equipment and training are closely integrated and not fungible. In addition, 
military tradition, organisational interests, and most important, the primary threat 
assessment affect the character of an actor’s military capability.  
 
Consider the following example. A strong actor attacks a weak actor directly with the 
aim to capture or eliminate its armed forces.42 The weak actor, having inferior 
weapons, is aware that it cannot defeat the strong actor militarily. Therefore it avoids 
direct confrontation, but nonetheless attempts to impose costs on the strong actor in 
order to affect its will to fight. Such costs include the loss of soldiers, supplies, 
infrastructure, and most important, time (ibid: 103). To be able to accomplish such 
goals, the weak actor resorts to guerrilla warfare strategy, whose tactics deflect 
military and technological superiority of its adversary.  The logic of the guerrilla 
strategy, is probably best stated by its most famous practitioner Mao Tse-tung43:  
 
In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and 
attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; 
withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When 
guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances;                                                         
41  Barbarism is the systematic violation of the laws of war (such as Four Geneva Conventions of 1949) 
(Arreguin-Toft 2001: 101). It includes, inter alia, the use of prohibited weapons and depredations against the 
non-combatants (such as torture, murder, rape of prisoners and civilians, the use of concentration camps, 
strategic bombing against targets of no military value etc).   
42 This strategy is in accordance with a prevalent military belief that once an opponent’s military capability to 
wage war is destroyed, his will to continue fighting is irrelevant since the means to that end are no longer 
available (Mack 1975: 179). 
43 Mao’s model of protracted warfare was copied to a large extent by, among others, the Mujahidin (Arreguin-
Toft 2001: 106). The Taliban was also observed to study the revolutionary strategy of Mao Tse-tung (Bøe-
Hansen 2009 [the interview]). 
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harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when 
he withdraws” (Arreguin-Toft 2001:104).  
 
The weak actor does not have forces trained and equipped for fighting a war, but relies 
on irregular armed forces, which are difficult to distinguish from civilians when not in 
actual combat. Thus the strong actor’s forces kill and injure civilians when targeting 
guerrilla fighters, which turns the population against the strong actor. The weak actor 
exploits the mistakes of the strong actor in order to get the support of the population, 
which it needs to be able to defy the strong actor. The population provides 
intelligence, logistical support and, most important, replacement. In addition to social 
support, the weak actor depends on the access to physical sanctuary (inaccessible 
terrain such as high mountains, jungle, swamps etc.) or political sanctuary (for 
example, permeable border areas) where guerrilla fighters can retreat and recuperate. 
As long as the weak actor has access to these two elements, it can defy the strong actor 
knowing that delay favours the weak (ibid: 104). At the same time, the domestic 
political audience closely follows the strong actor’s performance in the theatre. As the 
war drags on, it will appear increasingly incompetent. The domestic pressure will 
grow as military costs increase and war casualties rise. In addition, if a war is fought in 
a distant theatre, the domestic political audience will not be able to see that the 
survival of the nation is directly at stake, which will make sacrifice and risking death 
in a battle meaningless (Mack 1975: 186). As a result, the strong actor withdraws its 
armed forces under domestic pressure, and the weak actor wins.  
 
I now turn to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. I proceed to introduce the actors. 
Relying on the presented theoretical framework, I distinguish between two parties44: 
peace spoilers and peace custodians.   
 
 
                                                        
44 In contrast to the authors (see, for example, Håvoll 2008) who focus on a plethora of actors in Afghanistan 
arguing that it gives a qualitatively new dimension to the conflict, I believe, in line with Kydd (2004:346), that 
most conflicts can be reduced to two sides. 
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3.2.  Spoilers in Afghanistan  
In this section I discuss spoilers groups in Afghanistan, their position vis-à-vis the 
peace settlement, their goals and strategies, as well as the locus of spoiler behaviour 
within the group. I conclude that the spoilers to the peace process in Afghanistan are 
outside and total spoilers, according to the spoiler typology (Stedman 1997). 
Furthermore, I describe the factors that sustain the insurgency. 
 
The spoilers in Afghanistan have been casually referred to as the Taliban.45  As an 
aggregative shorthand term ‘the Taliban’ refers to a plethora of actors who have 
undermined the peace process since the fall of the Taliban regime and the subsequent 
Bonn peace agreement of 2001, and encompasses the remnants of the Taliban, 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyars’s Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, al Qaeda, other foreign 
fighters, criminal groups and a number of Afghan and Pakistani tribal militia (Jones 
2009: 152). The core of the spoiler problem, however, lies in a threefold militant 
structure consisting of two indigenous groups, the Taliban and Hezbi-i-Islami, and one 
transnational network, al Qaeda (Hodes and Cedra 2007b: 31; Jones 2006: 116). 46 As 
the defeated party in the Afghan civil war (due to the US assistance to the adversary, 
the Northern Alliance), these groups were excluded from the peace negotiations and 
were not signatories to the peace settlement. As such, they qualify as outside spoilers.  
 
What brings these parties together are their common goals: to overthrow the present 
government and compel foreign troops to withdraw. Beyond this, they may have 
                                                        
45 To circumvent oversimplification, some authors employ terms such as militants (Suhrke 2008), insurgents, or 
the Taliban-led insurgency (Cyrus and Sedra 2007). In this thesis I choose to use the label Taliban to refer to the 
insurgents in Afghanistan, although I also use the terms insurgents and the Taliban-led insurgency. 
46 Some see the Haqqani network as a separate entity from the Taliban; most sources agree that the leader of the 
Haqqani network, Jajaluddin Haqqani, remained loyal to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar ”even if the 
relationship between the two went through a period of crisis in the last few years of the Taliban regime” 
(Guistozzi 2007: 91). However, to what degree the Haqqani network is under the central leadership of the 
Taliban remains uncertain, since the Taliban structures “remain extremely secretive and elusive” (Ruttig 2009: 
61).  
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different, but not necessarily conflicting, interests47 (Jones 2006: 116).  Their 
commitment to the common goals has not weakened after eight years of the Karzai 
government, and the increasing foreign military presence that supports it. On the 
contrary, their defiance of post-Bonn Afghanistan has grown stronger, strengthening 
their reputation as total spoilers. As these goals meet the criteria of total goals, these 
parties qualify as total spoilers. 
 
In dealing with total spoilers, it is particularly relevant to determine the locus of 
spoiler behaviour. Does the impetus for spoiling come from the leader or its followers? 
This can be established by examining the structure of a group. I assume that the more 
hierarchical a group is, the greater the probability that the impetus for spoiler 
behaviour comes from the leader. However, the insurgent groups in Afghanistan are 
extremely secretive and it is difficult to ascertain their organisational structure and 
internal decision-making process. The Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami are reported to have 
loosely hierarchical organisational structures; al Qaeda guerrilla units are more 
autonomous, at least at the tactical and organisational level, while at the strategic level 
so-called foreign fighters take guidance from more senior al Qaeda commanders 
(Jones 2006: 116-117).  
 
Typically for total spoilers, these parties have employed violence to achieve their 
goals. Initially, the tactics consisted of attacks and assassinations of so-called soft 
targets associated with foreign presence, such as the UN, NGOs and humanitarian 
organisations (Suhrke 2008: 217). Over time the spoilers adopted new techniques, 
including suicide attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IED), and 
widened the scope of targets to include pro-government forces (NATO and coalition 
                                                        
47 Hekmatyar may be interested in the position of a leader once the present government is ousted from power. 
The Taliban seeks to impose the strictest interpretation of Islam on the Afghan society. Al Qaida, on the other 
hand, has much broader objectives (such as to overthrow corrupt regimes in Muslim countries and establish 
sharia, impose cost on Western forces and make them leave Muslim countries (Jones 2009: 76). However, as a 
transnational network, al Qaeda depends on movements like the Taliban, which can provide them with a safe 
haven to wage a global jihad.  
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forces, the Afghan army and the police) (Hodes and Cedra 2007: 27). By 2006, their 
opposition had grown into a full-scale insurgency (Guistozzi 2007: vii).  
 
The Afghan insurgency is usually described as a typical case of asymmetric conflict. 
The insurgents are reported mimicking Mao’s strategy of guerrilla warfare (Guistozzi 
2007:99). Recall the two requirements for successful guerrilla warfare: the access to a 
sanctuary and the support of the population. The insurgents have found shelter in the 
harsh mountainous terrain as well as Pakistani tribal areas accessible through the 2,430 
km long and permeable border with Pakistan. As regards popular support, the 
insurgents have employed various means to obtain it. First, they have exploited 
grievances of the population associated with foreign presence (civilian casualties, 
humiliating house searches and arrests, the eradication of poppy fields etc.) and weak, 
corrupted and ineffective governance (Guistozzi 2007: 51). Second, they have carried 
campaigns of intimidation and murder to obtain tacit popular support due to the fear of 
reprisal (ibid: 51). In addition, funds derived from opium production and trafficking, 
as well as from foreign funds and extortion, have facilitated recruitment (Guistozzi 
2007: 86). Furthermore, the Taliban ideology – with an appeal to true believers ready 
to sacrifice their lives for the cause – has been an important asset for the recruitment  
(ibid. 15).   
 
3.3. Peace Custodians 
The label ‘peace custodians’ refers to international actors mandated to oversee the 
implementation of a peace settlement (Stedman 1997). According to the Annex II of 
the Bonn Agreement, the Special Representative of the UN Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan (UNAMA48) “shall monitor and assist in the implementation of all aspects 
of the peace agreement”. Its role, however, will not be examined here, because 
UNAMA is a political actor, and not directly involved in the spoiler management. The                                                         
48 UNAMA was established in 2002 with the mandate to “to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan by 
leading efforts of the international community in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan in rebuilding 
the country and strengthening the foundations of peace and constitutional democracy” (UNAMA 2009). 
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international actors dealing with spoiler management are security forces, whose 
responsibility is, inter alia49, the provision of security. These are: International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition (OEF). My 
primary focus is ISAF, since ISAF is the only international security actor with an 
explicit responsibility to provide peace and security in Afghanistan. I proceed to 
outline the role of OEF, and its relation to ISAF before I discuss ISAF and its 
mandate. As emphasized throughout the thesis, the mandate of the international actors 
is to assist the Afghan government to exercise its authority. Correspondingly, ISAF 
assists the Afghan army (ANA) and the police to fight the insurgency. The efforts of 
the indigenous actors, however, will not be discussed separately, but are considered 
implicitly within ISAF efforts. 
 
3.3.1. The Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition 
As all threats to security in Afghanistan were not neutralised50 by the time the peace 
agreement was concluded in Bonn in December 2001, the US-led coalition continued 
to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) beyond the initial military campaign 
set off on October 7, 2001 in response to 9/11. OEF is a counter-terrorist mission. Its 
primary objective has been to destroy the remnants of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and to 
bring to justice Osama bin Laden. “Finding Osama remained an overarching concern, 
if not an obsession, in Washington.” (Suhrke 2008: 217). In addition to counter-
terrorist operations, the coalition developed subsidiary objectives so as to promote 
security by deploying civil affair teams (in charge of humanitarian and reconstruction 
operations), training Afghan National Army and creating Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) (Thier 2006: 494). The coalition derives its mandate from the right of 
states to self-defence, stipulated by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Beyond this, the 
Coalition has not entered any agreement with the Afghan government to regulate the                                                         
49  International security forces operate along three main dimensions: security, governance, reconstruction and 
development (R&D). 
50 The bulk of the Taliban and al Qaeda forces were not captured or killed in the early fighting but escaped into 
Pakistan, or in the case of the Taliban melted back into their villages (Thier 2006: 486). 
  42 
status of its forces deployed in Afghanistan51 (Thier 2006: 493). OEF area of operation 
has been gradually taken over by ISAF, and OEF has been reduced to southern and 
eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border (CRS 2008: 1).  
 
The relation between OEF and ISAF is not always easy to distinguish, especially 
taking into consideration that American and allied troops participate in both operations 
in contiguous areas. Initially, OEF was envisaged to fight “the war on terror”, while 
ISAF was a ”stabilization mission”. However, with the expansion of ISAF to the south 
and east and its engagement in combat operations, the difference between the two has 
become more blurred. Some intermingling of the two missions has been difficult to 
avoid, as there is no clear dividing line between the regions where the Taliban and al 
Qaida are active and the relatively stable regions of the country. The two military 
operations are under separate military command, but there exists a “synergy” between 
the two commands, which allows each operation to support the other in times of 
emergency (CRS 2009: 18).52  
 
3.3.2. ISAF 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was deployed to Afghanistan in 2002, 
in accordance with the peace agreement (Annex I of the Bonn Agreement) and the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1386/2001. It is the only international security force with 
an explicit mandate to assist the Interim Authority, later on the Government, to 
maintain peace and security in Afghanistan. To fulfil its mandate, ISAF was 
authorised to use “all necessary measures” (UN SC 1386/2001). Its initial area of 
responsibility was limited to Kabul and its surroundings, where 5,000 ISAF troops 
                                                        
51 Unlike the Coalition, ISAF concluded a military-technical agreement with the Afghan interim authority to 
outline ISAF’s mission, area of responsibility, and the relationship with the interim administration and Afghan 
military forces (Thier 2006: 542) 
52 ISAF operates under NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (situated in Mons, Belgium); OEF operates under 
US Central Command in Tampa Florida. However, within Afghanistan the command chain of these two forces 
converge under American General McChrystal, as it did under his predecessor General McKiernan, before 
diverging again toward Mons and Tampa Florida (Dobbins 2009). 
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operated under British command53 until NATO took over in August 2003. 
Acknowledging the contribution ISAF made to improve security in Kabul54, the 
Afghan government, UNAMA, domestic and international civil society called for its 
expansion in order to “create a secure environment for peacebuilding”, which was 
authorised by the UN SC 1510/2003. The expansion was implemented in four stages. 
Stage I and II, implemented in 2005, entailed the expansion into the relatively peaceful 
northern and western regions respectively.55 The objective was to “demonstrate 
presence on behalf of central government” and assist reconstruction (Suhrke 2008: 
223). Stage III, implemented in July 2006, entailed the deployment of ISAF troops to 
the south, where it faced a tenacious insurgency.56 Stage IV entailed the expansion to 
the east. By October 2006 ISAF had taken over security responsibility throughout 
Afghanistan, breaking the country up into five Regional Commands (RC East, West, 
North, South, and Capital)(ISAF). 
 
The current UN SC Resolution 1868/2009 calls upon ISAF, in conjunction with the 
OEF coalition, “to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of 
Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups, criminals and 
those involved in the narcotics trade”. The resolution, however, does not provide 
details of how ISAF should accomplish the tasks. The resolutions’ provisions are 
                                                        
53  Prior to NATO’s command, the leadership over ISAF was rotated every six months (after British, it was 
under Turkish, then under the joint Dutch-German command) (Thier 2006: 544). 
54 In the first six months, starting January 2002, crime dropped 70% due to extensive patrolling throughout the 
area of operation (Thier 2006: 547). This was a significant improvement for ordinary Kabulis as no government 
has been able to control the situation in Kabul in the last two decades. 
55 During Stage I (December 2003-October 2004), Germany established the first ISAF PRT in Kunduz in 
northern Afghanistan and ISAF took over four PRTs from the US-led Coalition: in Mazar-i-Sharif, Maimana, 
Faizabad, and Baghlan. In Stage II, from May 2005, ISAF assumed command over two PRTs in western 
Afghanistan – Herat and Farah, and established two new PRTs in Ghor and Badghis province in western 
Afghanistan (ISAF). 
56 ISAF assumed command over six additional southern provinces – Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, 
Uruzgan and Zabul, and four PRTs. 
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refined into active policy measures by the allies themselves in consultation with the 
Afghan government.  
 
I proceed to discuss the strategies these actors have applied in Afghanistan in order to 
manage spoilers to the peace process. 
 
3.4. Spoiler Management in Afghanistan: Coercion 
Two of the coercive strategies Stedman (1997) describes have been applied in the 
post-Bonn Afghanistan: “the departing train” and the use of force.57  
 
3.4.1. The ‘Departing Train Strategy’ 
The ‘departing train’ strategy, as outlined in 3.1.1, denotes that spoilers will be 
excluded from a peace process. The Bonn peace agreement was a settlement among 
the various groups that won over the Taliban, due to the superior US military support. 
The Taliban as a defeated party was not a signatory and the agreement had no 
provisions for the integration of its remnants or the populations associated with it 
(Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand 2004: 3-4). Excluding the Taliban from the peace 
settlement was due to two issues. First, the Taliban’s preferences, as those of a total 
spoiler, were considered impossible to accommodate. Second, in the aftermath of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban was regarded a “spent force” (i.e. incapable 
to pose a threat to the viability of the Afghan state). For example, Olivier Roy, one of 
the most prominent experts on Afghanistan, found it “unlikely that the Taliban 
resistance will come into being”, and suggested that the defeat of the Taliban was “the 
signal of the probable disappearance of the radical Islamists in Afghanistan” 
(Dorronsoro 2005: 313). In accordance with these premises, ISAF was deployed to 
                                                        
57 I list only these two strategies, as my focus is the period after the conclusion of the Bonn agreement. However, 
the United States initially pursued coercive diplomacy against the Taliban, which failed and instead the US 
resorted to force in Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001.  
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strengthen the sides of peace, as the “departing train strategy” specifies. In that 
context, resources have been invested in the training of indigenous security forces. 
 
The departing train strategy is still applied in Afghanistan, albeit with decreasing 
confidence that “the peace process will irrevocably go forward” (italics added). The 
Taliban, contrary to the initial assessments that it would be incapable of undermining 
the peace process, managed to regroup itself and has posed a serious security threat 
that hampers political and physical reconstruction of the country. Consequently, force 
was increasingly applied against the spoilers. 
 
3.4.2. The Use of Force 
This section presents an overview of use-of-force strategies applied in Afghanistan. 
The overview would not be complete, if it focused only on ISAF. ISAF took over 
command over combat operations in the south and east from the US-led coalition, 
whose spoiler management had an impact on the dynamics of the insurgency, as well 
as on the strategies NATO would adopt. For a complete overview, I present both OEF 
and ISAF strategies by outlining a strategy and discussing the implications of its 
application in the field.  
 
In this section I demonstrate that force is sometimes used to target an enemy and 
sometimes to target the factors that enable the enemy to persist and pose a threat. The 
former objective is realised by an enemy-centred strategy that targets spoilers directly, 
while the latter objective may be accomplished by a so-called population-centred 
strategy that aims to protect civilian population in a conflict and win its support. 58 
 
I first discuss the strategies the OEF Coalition applied in dealing with spoilers in 
Afghanistan. These are: 
                                                         
58 General David Barno, the Commander of US-led Coalition 2003-2005, refers to these two approaches as: an 
‘enemy-centric raid strategy’ vs. a ‘people-centric’ counterinsurgency (Suhrke 2008: 222).  
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i) Counterterrorism 
ii) Counterinsurgency (COIN).59 
 
Counterterrorism60 is an enemy-centred strategy. It has been implemented through (i) 
light and (b) heavy military footprint. The light footprint, which was used initially, 
implies a very light presence of ground troops (usually special operation force) and a 
heavy dependence on air power, as well as close cooperation with indigenous ground 
troops (Suhrke 2008: 215). It was devised on the basis of the “lessons learnt” by the 
Soviet Union, whose heavy military footprint, with over 100,000 ground troops, was 
perceived as an occupation, and fiercely resisted by the Afghans.  
 
The light footprint approach was not as efficient as anticipated due to at least three 
important shortcomings. First, the cooperation with indigenous troops proved to be 
problematic as Afghan troops turned out to be corrupt, disorganised and unmotivated. 
During the coalition operations in 2001 the Taliban and al Qaeda managed to escape 
into Pakistan by bribing some of the Afghan commanders. Later on, the Taliban was 
able to infiltrate some of the Afghan militia, for example during the operation 
Mountain Storm in early 2004, when it turned against US troops (Suhrke 2008: 216). 
Second, few ground troops made it impossible for the Coalition to hold the territory, 
which it cleared previously from insurgents. Third, the inherent risk-averseness of this 
approach, manifested in heavy reliance on air power, leads to high numbers of civilian 
casualties, which in turn decreases popular support for foreign military presence. All 
these limitations convinced the US Army of the need to increase the number of its own 
ground troops and from 2004 the light footprint approach was abandoned. 
 
                                                        
59 It is important to note that these strategies have never been applied in pure, but rather in hybrid forms. For 
example, the US-led coalition conducted counterterrorism operations alongside small-scale humanitarian and 
reconstruction projects. A pure counterinsurgency campaign was impossible to implement due to the lack of 
necessary resources. 
60 I refer to this strategy as “counterterrorism” as the US-led Coalition fought the war on terror in Afghanistan – 
the enemy was the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda and those that provided it with a safe haven. 
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The heavy footprint implies an increased number of combat ground troops, which 
operate with close air support. This approach required force expansion and a steady 
increase in US troop deployment followed. At the tactical level, the troops were 
engaged, inter alia, in cordon-and-search operations. Acting on intelligence tips, troops 
raided villages in search of insurgents backed up by close air support.  
 
The military build-up had two consequences. First, it affected the dynamics of the 
insurgency: faced with a better equipped and more numerous enemy, the insurgents 
began to rely increasingly on asymmetric warfare employing new techniques, such as 
suicide bombing and improvised explosive devices (IED).61 Second, it undermined 
popular support. The culturally insensitive modus operandi of cordon-and-search 
operations, together with civilian casualties, undermined popular support for foreign 
military presence (Suhrke 2008: 221). Recognizing that waging conventional warfare 
against insurgents has limited and even counterproductive utility, the US Army started 
to consider a population-centred approach – counterinsurgency (COIN), as established 
by the US Army Field Manual FM 3-24.62 
 
Counterinsurgency 
The goal of counterinsurgency is to win the support of the population.63 Its core 
assumption is that the protection, welfare and support of the people are vital to the 
success. However, gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge that 
requires comprehensive military and civilian efforts. An efficient counterinsurgency 
strategy combines offensive, defensive, and stability operations, whereas offensive 
operations focus on eliminating the enemy, defensive operations focus on protecting 
                                                        
61  Another factor that contributed to the new insurgent techniques was the invasion of Iraq, which put 
Afghanistan into a context of global jihad (Suhrke 2008: 220). 
62 According to Ravndal (2009) FM-3-24 does not contain any new or “groundbreaking thoughts” on COIN. It is 
based on classical COIN publications, as well as on a long tradition of American field manuals addressing 
irregular warfare (FFI Report 2009/01346). 
63  Indicators measuring popular support are: assistance in gathering accurate intelligence and popular 
participation in political processes. 
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the population and infrastructure from direct attacks, and stability operations64 secure 
the local population and provide for essential services.65 The proportion of effort is 
determined by the security situation and needs of the population in question. As 
security improves, stability operations become more about governance, reconstruction 
and economic development, and expand across the area of operation. 
 
The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective 
governance by a legitimate government (FM 3-24: 1-21).66 In that regard, it is 
necessary to strengthen institutions and train indigenous security forces. To ensure 
such a development the following principles must be followed, according to the US 
Army Field Manual FM 3-24 (1-23): 
1. Civilian and military efforts in a counterinsurgency campaign must be 
coordinated. Unity of effort is paramount. 
2. The primary purpose of military actions is to create a safe environment for 
political and economic development. Military operations should be conducted 
only if they lead to positive political effects. In that regard, use of force must 
not be counterproductive - excessive use of force undermines the achievement 
of the overarching political goals. The risk for collateral damage must be 
minimized, as it fuels insurgent recruitment. Whenever possible, indigenous 
security forces should apply force.67 
3. COIN strategy must take into account the particular environment (society and 
culture) where the campaign is conducted in order not to alienate the 
population. 
                                                        
64 Throughout the thesis I use the terms stability operations and stabilization interchangeably.  
65 Such as water, electricity, sanitation, medical services, basic education and similar. Local preferences should 
be appreciated and needs assessments should reflect cultural sensitivity (FM 3-24: 5-14). 
66 A government is considered to be effective and legitimate if it is elected in fair and free elections, is able to 
provide security for the population, works on political, social and economic development, respects the rule of 
law, fights corruption etc. at a culturally accepted level (FM 3-24: 1-21). 
67 Only if the population regards the indigenous army and the police as competent and impartial. In Afghanistan, 
the army enjoys popular respect, while the police are perceived as corrupted.  
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4. The focus should not be on killing or capturing every insurgent, but rather on 
cutting off the sources of their recuperative power. These include social, 
political and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency, but also border 
control and population control (i.e. isolating insurgents from the population). 
5. Security for the civilian population under the rule of law is essential. 
Protecting the population, not the COIN force, leads to the ultimate success. 
This is the cornerstone of the COIN doctrine.  
6. Popular support allows counterinsurgents to develop the intelligence 
necessary to identify and defeat insurgents. Timely and reliable intelligence is 
a precondition for effective operations.  
7. Counterinsurgency is a long-term commitment. The population will not 
support the counterinsurgents if they are not convinced that they have the 
ability, stamina and will to win. The population must be confident about the 
staying power of the counterinsurgents. For that reason, international security 
force should constantly reaffirm its commitment to COIN effort and enjoy 
support back home for a protracted deployment. 
 
COIN strategy is typically implemented through a clear-hold-build approach.68 Clear 
is a tactical mission with the aim to eliminate insurgent presence in the area of 
operation through cordon-and-search operations. The force employs a combination of 
offensive small-unit operations, such as saturation patrolling, interdiction ambushes 
and targeted raids. The hold phase aims to further eliminate insurgent infrastructure by 
establishing security forces bases among the population. The objective of this phase is 
to create secure physical and psychological environment, as well as to re-establish 
national government presence at the local level. Build refers to capacity building for 
the provision of essential services (water, electricity, sanitation, health, education etc), 
good governance and economic development (ibid: 5-23). 
 
                                                        
68 Other approaches include combined action and limited support. For more information, see FM 3-24: 5-18. 
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On the basis of the above it can be concluded that COIN operations are extremely 
complex and resource, manpower and time intensive. Securing the population requires 
vast resources, first of all, a high density of security forces. A rule of thumb stipulates 
approximately 20-25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents in an area of 
operation (FM 3-24: 1-13), meaning that a country the size of Afghanistan would need 
a force of approx. 570,000, along with a range of civilian experts.69 In addition to 
resources, long-term commitment is a prerequisite to gain and maintain the populace 
support. For all these reasons a protracted counterinsurgency may be hard to sustain. 
With the elapse of time and mounting casualties, weariness with the mission increases 
in a troop contributing country, which is the very goal of insurgents who try to win by 
undermining and outlasting public support in the countries involved in the 
counterinsurgency.  
 
Despite the proclaimed intent70 to follow the COIN doctrine in Afghanistan, it is 
questionable whether and to what extent the OEF coalition has actually managed to 
apply it. First of all, a force of approximately 20,000 troops is not sufficient to conduct 
a comprehensive COIN campaign in a country the size of Afghanistan. However, 
some COIN elements were employed in order to win “hearts and minds” of the 
population, through the Coalition civil-military teams71, that have been responsible for 
planning and executing the Coalition humanitarian and reconstruction operations 
(Thier 2006: 495).  For example, by April 2004, the Coalition helped to build 400 
schools, dig 600 wells and construct 170 health clinics, in projects that employed a 
total of 30,000 Afghans (ibid: 496). On the other hand, military operations were 
shaped by the principle of force protection rather than the populace protection. Such 
                                                        
 
69 Political, social, and economic programs are most commonly associated with civilian organizations and 
expertise; however, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. 
If adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces fill the gap (FM 3-24: 2-9). 
70 In 2003, General Barno, the commander of the US-led Coalition, promoted ‘people centric’ counterinsurgency 
based on tolerance and respect. For that purpose, he issued a Directive for the troops consisting of a 15-point list 
of do’s and don’t’s (Suhrke 2008: 222). 
71 CJCMOTF, CAT-A and later on PRT. 
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risk-averse operational culture tends to alienate the population, as stated in the US 
COIN doctrine.  
 
ISAF strategies  
Two variables determine ISAF strategies of spoiler management: security situation 
and the contributing nation.72 Depending on these variables, there are two main 
approaches:  
(i) Stabilization73, and  
(ii) Counterinsurgency (COIN).  
 
A relatively secure environment allows for the implementation of stabilization 
strategies, whereas the existence of insurgency requires a more robust military 
response as prescribed by COIN. Geographically, stability operations have been 
predominant in relatively peaceful northern and western Afghanistan, while COIN has 
dominated in turbulent southern and eastern provinces. Chronologically, stabilization 
was prevalent during the Kabul period, as well as during the Stage I and II (ISAF 
expansion to northern and western regions), while COIN became an established 
strategy with ISAF expanding to the south where it was confronted with the resilient 
insurgency. However, it is important to note that these terms are far from standardized. 
Depending on the contributing nation, its military tradition and domestic political 
support, a range of stabilization and counterinsurgency models has been applied.  
 
Stabilization  
Stability operations, as defined within the outline on the American COIN doctrine, 
may be the last phase within the COIN approach (which corresponds to the hold-build 
phases in the clear-hold-build approach) or an independent strategy in a relatively 
                                                        
72Some nations have national caveats for their troop engagement in combat operations. 
73 ISAF/NATO’s vocabulary includes terms such as ‘stability operations’, ‘stabilization mission’, while the 
media often use ‘nation building’ and ‘state building’. The term ‘stabilization’ as used here corresponds to the 
category ‘peace support operations’ (PSO) and its peacekeeping and peacebuilding dimensions. For an overview 
on PSO typologies see Durch (2006: 5-9).  
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secure environment. The stabilization strategy consists of two components: i) security 
and ii) reconstruction and development (R&D). Security is managed by military force 
that patrols the area of operation thus demonstrating presence on behalf of the central 
government and aiming to deter potential spoilers. The R&D component, including 
governance capacity building, addresses potential grievances that may fuel the 
insurgency and thus reduces the prospects for recruitment.    
 
Stabilization strategies are implemented by ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs), which consist of military force and civilian personnel, led by individual ISAF 
nation. Currently, 26 PRTs operate in Afghanistan (ISAF). ISAF PRTs differ 
considerably depending on the operational environment and the lead nation.74 PRTs 
military components, however, are under the ISAF command and are coordinated by 
the relevant Regional Command. 
 
PRT is not intended for the business of coercion, but for “robust military diplomacy” 
(Jakobsen 2005:12). Military force within a PRT is equipped for self-defence only, 
like traditional peacekeeping forces, but can call military backup in the form of rapid 
reaction forces and air power in an emergency (Jakobsen 2005: 12). For example, 
when the Norwegian-led PRT in Meymaneh, northern Afghanistan, was attacked, a 
British quick reaction force was called in to control the situation (Forsvaret.no).  The 
Norwegian military capacity was insufficient to handle a mob consisting of 200-300 
persons breaking into the camp.  
 
To what extent has the stabilization strategy been effectively implemented in practice? 
The Norwegian experience from the relatively peaceful northern Afghanistan (Faryab                                                         
74 PRTs differ on size, composition and operational style (Jakobsen 2005:11). However, three PRT models (the 
US, the UK and the German model) are usually distinguished on the basis of the following determinants: 1) the 
degree of civil-military integration, 2) the approach to R&D. Thus, the US model is under military command, 
and emphasizes quick impact projects. In the UK model, military, political and development efforts are jointly 
led. Military force is organised in mobile observation teams, and soldiers live amongst villagers. The focus is on 
local institution building and rule of law. In the German model, military and civilian components are totally 
separate. German PRTs have large military component, which operate in heavily armed patrols (in comparison 
to light armed British) and are located in the bases.  
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Province) indicates that governance and the R&D aspects of the operation are often 
neglected at the expense of security (Heier 2009 [interview]). This is explained by the 
fact that military force is trained to assess threat perceptions, rather than to tackle 
underlying causes of a conflict. An additional problem is the civil-military 
cooperation.  
 
Assuming that northern Afghanistan, as the most stable part of the country, represents 
the most likely case for the stabilization strategy to work, it is unlikely that the strategy 
was more effectively implemented in the rest of the country.  
 
COIN  
In dealing with the spoilers, ISAF’s use of force is guided by, inter alia, ISAF Tactical 
Directive for the employment of force75 and the ISAF Commander’s 
Counterinsurgency Guidance. NATO has not developed a specific ISAF COIN 
strategy, but follows the doctrine as established by FM 3-24 (Heier 2009 [interview]).  
 
Although it appears that there is a consensus among ISAF members that COIN is the 
appropriate strategy to handle the insurgency, the actual implementation is not 
consistent across the theatre. It depends on the area of operation and available 
resources, but also on the military tradition of a contributing nation, which may 
emphasize some COIN elements over others.76 However, ISAF members lack proper 
resources for a comprehensive COIN campaign, as evident in the ISAF Commander 
Assessment Report of 30 August 2009, which calls for the change in operational 
culture and “the implementation of a properly resourced integrated civilian-military 
counterinsurgency campaign” (COMISAF: 1-1) /italics added/.  
                                                        
75 The most recent Tactical Directive was released on 6 July, 2009, available at 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf , accessed 29 September 2009. 
76 The British emphasize cultural awareness, the French cooperation with indigenous security forces, while the 
Dutch stress the importance of minimizing collateral damage. For more information on French, British and 
Dutch approaches to COIN, see FFI rapport 2009/01346.  
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In conclusion, the enemy-centred strategy was abandoned for the population-centred 
strategy (COIN). However, the full COIN campaign has not been feasible as the 
international actors have not had sufficient resources at their disposal so as to properly 
address the three pillars of COIN – security, governance and R&D. First, the 
international actors lack a sufficient number of ground troops to protect the population. 
For that reason, they have infrequently utilized their technological superiority over the 
insurgents and resorted to the enemy-centred approach, which appears to be little 
appropriate for guerrilla warfare and tends to undermine other potential positive 
outcomes accomplished within COIN and related to governance and R&D.  In 
addition, the international financial assistance to Afghanistan has been among the 
lowest of any stabilization operations since the Second World War (Jones 2006:111).  
This has further challenged the fostering of effective governance and economic 
development as a way to tackle the factors that sustain insurgency.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter identifies the actors in the Afghan conflict as peace spoilers and peace 
custodians. Spoilers, although manifold, have common goals: to overthrow present 
government and compel foreign forces to withdraw. On the basis of their common 
preferences, I consider the spoilers as one single player, which I refer to as the Taliban 
in the formal model that I present in the next chapter.  The Taliban’s adversary in the 
model is ISAF. As a player, ISAF stands for the international and national security 
forces that fight the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. I chose ISAF as an aggregate 
term because ISAF has an explicit mandate to provide peace and security in 
Afghanistan.  The chapter also provides the rationale for using force against the 
Taliban and outlines two use-of-force strategies ISAF may use in order to defeat the 
Taliban: the enemy-centred strategy and the population-centred strategy. The 
effectiveness of these strategies against the Taliban will be examined in the subsequent 
chapters.  
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4. A Formal Model of Coercive Spoiler 
Management  
The use of force may be an effective strategy in the management of a total spoiler 
(Stedman 1997). An effective strategy in this thesis is a strategy that neutralizes a 
spoiler to the extent that it does not pose a problem to peace. In that context, the use of 
force can either (i) eliminate a spoiler, or (ii) induce a spoiler to comply with an 
imposed peace agreement. Note that the elimination of a spoiler, in the sense of its 
removal, is meaningful only if force is used to target the leadership that is the impetus 
for spoiler behaviour; if that is not the case, the strategy is meaningless since killing 
every militant is an impossible task, and may violate the laws of war. I focus primarily 
on the capacity of force to induce compliance, either by deterring or altering 
unacceptable spoiler behaviour.  
 
Under what conditions is force likely to work? Two possible scenarios are identified in 
the literature on coercion.77  
 
1) Force tends to be effective primarily at the threat stage. “If [the threat] fails”, as 
Schelling (2006: 2) poignantly remarks, the actual use of force “ is both costly 
and ineffectual”.  
 
2) When the threat of force has failed, the actual use of force may work only if: (i) 
the threat of force failed because the threatened party’s initial threat assessment 
was erroneous; (ii) the threatened party corrected its initial threat assessment 
after the threat had been executed, that is, after force had actually been used. A 
threat assessment concerns the potency, credibility and contingency aspect of a 
threat (Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz 2005: 480).  
 
                                                        
77 Under the assumption that actors are rational. 
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The objective of this chapter is to consider the first condition; in the subsequent 
chapter I examine the second condition. Here I consider the proposition that force 
failed to deter the Taliban from spoiler behaviour because the threat of force proved to 
be ineffective. Recall that a threat of force, to be effective, must be credible, 
sufficiently severe, relevant, clear and complete (Hovi 1998). I treat the latter three 
requirements as given, that is, I assume that the threat of force is relevant, clear and 
complete. In other words, I assume that i) the insurgents have an incentive to violate 
the peace; ii) the insurgents understand that force will be used unless they comply with 
the peace agreement; and iii) the insurgents know that the threat of force will not be 
carried out if they do not violate the peace. Thus, I consider two possibilities: (i) the 
threat is not deemed credible; and (ii) the threat is not deemed sufficiently severe. 
 
I now present and analyze a simple game-theoretic model, which makes it possible to 
consider this proposition in more detail. In the subsequent chapter, I analyze the same 
model under a different set of assumptions regarding the information available to the 
insurgents in order to examine the conditions under which the use of force may work 
after the threat of force has failed. 
 
4.1. The Model 
The model I present and analyze in this thesis draws upon the game theoretic model 
developed by Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz (2005) in order to examine the conditions 
under which imposed economic sanctions work. The applicability of the sanction 
model on counterinsurgency warfare confirms Drezner’s (2003: 646) observation that 
the use of force (military coercion) and the use of sanctions (economic coercion) have 
similar dynamics.78 The model in this thesis, which examines the conditions under 
which the threat or use of force might work against the insurgents in Afghanistan, 
keeps the game structure of the Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz model on economic 
sanctions; however, I introduce some important differences regarding the payoffs,                                                         
78 Drezner (2003:646) argues that game-theoretic models on economic sanctions resemble Fearon’s (1995) 
arguments of why rational unitary actors go to war.  
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which will be outlined after the model has been fully explained. Needless to say, the 
ranking of coercion costs and audience costs is adapted as appropriate to the situation 
in Afghanistan.    
 
4.2. The Sequence of Decisions 
There are two players, the Taliban and ISAF. ISAF wants to deter potential spoiler 
behaviour. The Taliban is aware that ISAF’s mandate is to maintain security; therefore 
a threat is not explicitly made, but assumed, i.e. the model assumes it is common 
knowledge that a threat is inherent in the game structure.  
 
The Taliban makes the first move in the game and must decide whether to violate the 
peace or not. I consider any attack on ISAF troops, indigenous security forces or 
civilians, in a conventional or unconventional manner (such as suicide bombers, IED), 
as a violation of the peace. ISAF is able to observe the Taliban’s move. If the Taliban 
does not violate the peace, ISAF has no choice to make and the game ends. If the 
Taliban violates the peace, ISAF must respond by choosing between three military 
options. The first option – a minimum response – implies only necessary defence. The 
second and third options are offensive in character, where the second is an enemy-
centred strategy and the third is a population-centred strategy – a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency campaign (COIN) as outlined in section 3.4.2. Recall that the goal 
of an enemy-centred strategy is to eliminate/defeat an enemy, while the goal of a 
population-centred strategy is to win the support of a population. 
 
I consider three ISAF options in order to be able to examine both the credibility of the 
threat of force and the potency of applied force within the framework of a single 
model. For that purpose, I assume (1) that the Taliban is able to observe ISAF’s move; 
and (2) that the Taliban is prepared to stand firm if ISAF opts for the enemy-centred 
strategy but it will yield79 in case ISAF implements the population-centred strategy.                                                         
79I find the term ‘yield’ adequate for the Taliban’s potential response to the enemy-centred strategy, but not 
necessarily to the population-centred strategy. However, I continue to use the same term for the sake of 
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This assumption is based on the established military doctrine that argues that an 
insurgency can be defeated only by winning the support of a population (Galula 1966; 
FM 3-24). 
 
If ISAF chooses a minimum response, the Taliban does not get to make a move as I 
assume that the minimum response is not sufficient to make the Taliban consider 
whether to yield or not. Therefore the game ends and the Taliban continues with its 
noncompliance. In contrast, if ISAF chooses either the enemy-centred or the 
population-centred strategy, the game continues. The Taliban responds by choosing 
one of two options: yield and not yield. If the Taliban yields, ISAF stops prosecuting 
them (the status quo is re-established); if the Taliban does not yield, ISAF continues 
the offensive.  
 
4.3.  Discussion of the Model’s Payoffs 
The objective of this section is to discuss one type of benefit (violation benefit) and 
three types of cost (violation cost, military cost, and audience cost) for the contending 
parties.  
 
4.3.1. Benefits 
I assume that violating the peace entails certain benefits for the Taliban. By creating 
insecurity, the Taliban prevents political and economic reconstruction of the country, 
which, in turn, facilitates recruitment and opium production, and enables local power 
holding from which the Taliban movement benefits. Let B > 0 be the violation benefit 
obtained by the Taliban if all of the three following conditions are fulfilled: 1) the                                                                                                                                                                              
consistency, although it does not imply that I automatically expect the hard-core Taliban leadership to yield in 
case ISAF applies the population-centred strategy; rather, the movement may gradually lose its rank-and-file, 
financial resources and popular support. In that way, the movement may gradually wither away, disintegrate. 
The difficulty in finding a single term to encompass possible Taliban’s responses is also evident in General 
McChrystal’s assessment of August 30, 2009, where he anticipates that the Taliban will have three choices to the 
population-centred strategy: fight, flee and integrate, depending on the rank of an insurgent (COMISAF’s Initial 
Assessment 2009: 2-13)  
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Taliban violates the peace; 2) ISAF opts for either the minimum response or the 
enemy-centred strategy; and 3) the Taliban does not subsequently yield. I therefore 
assume that the Taliban will not be able to realize its potential violation benefit if 
ISAF decides to apply the population-centred strategy. That is because ISAF, by 
providing security and creating conditions for reconstruction and development, curbs 
the incentives of the populace to join the insurgents, engage in opium production etc.  
I proceed to discuss three types of costs that are assumed to be relevant in determining 
the outcome of the coercive spoiler management game. 
 
4.3.2. Costs 
While the Taliban benefits from the peace violation, ISAF suffers a violation cost. 
This cost may be direct (for example, loss of life, material damage, the cost of 
increased insecurity), or indirect (a damaged reputation of NATO as a security actor). 
Let C > 0 be the violation cost ISAF incurs in case the Taliban violates the peace and 
does not yield subsequently. Let Ci, where Ci < C, be the violation cost ISAF incurs in 
case the Taliban violates the peace and yields subsequently. Ci stands for direct 
violation costs. That is, Ci = C – R, where R stands for the indirect (reputation) costs 
NATO incurs as the security actor.  
A military response entails costs for both parties. However, I assume that a minimum 
military response does not incur additional costs80, since the minimum response entails 
“business as usual”. On the other hand, offensive military operations are costly. A 
population-centred strategy, i.e. a COIN campaign, requires vast resources, as it rests 
on comprehensive military and civilian efforts, and implies high risk for ISAF troops. 
Recall that according to the COIN doctrine force is used in a way that it does not 
alienate the population. This principle requires, inter alia, i) a heavy military footprint 
to protect the population; ii) a culturally sensitive modus operandi and iii) the use of                                                         
80 Additional to the cost of maintaining the troops deployed to a distant theatre and performing their regular 
duties (such as patrolling the area of operation).  
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firepower, particularly aerial bombardment, only when the risk of collateral damage is 
minimal. This strategy thus requires a less risk-averse operational culture which makes 
ISAF troops more vulnerable to the insurgents who fight only when the opponent 
(ISAF) cannot fully exploit its fighting capacity and technological superiority. 
Usually81, the Taliban engages in fighting only when it enjoys a tactical advantage 
(provided by, for example, a highly inaccessible mountainous terrain); otherwise it 
leaves an area of operation or melts into the civilian population. In conclusion, the 
population-centred strategy implies high risk for ISAF and medium risk for the 
Taliban. On the other hand, an enemy-centred strategy requires less manpower and 
resources, and ISAF troops bear less risk in comparison to the population-centred 
strategy. This is because ISAF utilizes its technological superiority and overwhelming 
firepower, especially air strikes, in its efforts to locate and eliminate the Taliban. To 
what extent the enemy-centred strategy will be successful depends on how reliable 
intelligence is. This strategy implies high risk for the Taliban provided that the 
intelligence is correct.  
 
Let the military cost for the Taliban be MTE if ISAF implements the enemy-centred 
strategy, and MTP if ISAF implements the population-centred strategy, given that the 
Taliban does not yield (where MTE > MTP  ≥ 0 ).82 If the Taliban yields, the military 
cost for the Taliban is αMTE in case of the enemy-centred strategy, and βMTP in case of 
the population-centred strategy respectively, where α, β are two constants (0 < (α, β) 
< 1), where α, β are temporal units, i.e. crude measures of how long it will take before 
the Taliban yields).                                                          
81 There are examples when the Taliban confronted NATO in relatively large formations rather than applying 
classic guerrilla techniques, as illustrated during the operation Medusa in Kandahar in 2006, when the Taliban 
suffered major losses (Suhrke 2008:226). However, having realized that “defeat is the invariable outcome where 
native forces fight with inferior weapons against modernised forces on the latter’s terms” as Mao Tse-tung 
argued, the Taliban started increasingly to rely on guerrilla warfare (Mao quoted in Mack 1975: 176) (the 
emphasis in original).   
82 The Taliban has advantage over ISAF in two areas: intelligence and knowledge of the terrain. Therefore MTP≥ 
0, because the Taliban may decide to leave the area prior to an ISAF offensive, and wait in Pakistan. 
Alternatively, the Taliban can engage only when it enjoys such an advantage that it cannot suffer any cost, under 
condition that ISAF does not use air power (hypothetically). For an example, consider the battle of Wanat 
(Shanker 2009). 
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Similarly, let the military cost for ISAF in case the Taliban does not yield be MIE if it 
opts for the enemy-centred strategy, and MIP if it undertakes the population-centred 
campaign, where MI P > MIE > 0, as the population-centred campaign is much more 
costly in comparison to the enemy-centred approach. In case the Taliban yields, the 
military cost for ISAF is αMIE   and βMIP, respectively. 
 
A final type of cost incorporated in the model is audience costs.83 As a minimum 
response will likely result in growing insecurity, I assume that domestic political 
audience in troop-contributing countries will question the purpose of ISAF’s presence 
in Afghanistan. Military presence in a distant foreign country is costly and if it does 
not fulfil its mandate, the electorate in troop-contributing countries, as well as political 
opponents, will blame the government for its choice of action, which has led to 
deteriorating security on “the first front in the war against terror”. Let AIMR be the 
audience costs ISAF suffers in case of the minimum response. The second option – the 
enemy-centred strategy, which relies heavily on air strikes, often implies collateral 
damage (a high number of civilian casualties) due to insecure intelligence and the 
nature of guerrilla warfare when the Taliban hides itself among the population. In case 
ISAF opts for the enemy-centred strategy and the Taliban does not yield, it will affect 
negatively, first of all, the Afghan public opinion, but also the international civil 
society and domestic public opinion in troop-contributing countries. Let AIE be the 
audience cost in case ISAF responds with the enemy-centred approach to the Taliban’s 
disruption of the peace, and the Taliban does not yield. The third option – the 
population-centred strategy – will significantly increase the likelihood for ISAF 
casualties, which decreases popular support for the war in ISAF contributing countries 
as the recent examples from Britain, the United States and Italy illustrate (Cooper 
2009a). Alternatively, increased casualties may trigger a nation involved in the 
counterinsurgency to impose a national caveat that restricts its troops engagement in 
combat operations. Let AIP be the audience costs ISAF will suffer in case it engages in 
a comprehensive COIN campaign and the Taliban does not yield, where AIP > AIE >                                                         
83 This notion is based on the assumption that wars are “public events carried out in front of a domestic political 
audience”, where the audience can observe and assess the performance of its leadership (Fearon 1994: 577).  
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AIMR > 0. That is, I assume that ISAF’s own casualties are more costly for the 
leadership in a troop-contributing country in comparison to Afghan civilian casualties, 
which are in turn more costly in relation to the costs of minimum response. The 
assumption AIP > AIE is derived from the conjecture that domestic popular support for 
the war in Afghanistan weighs more in relation to the indigenous support for the 
international military presence.84 In addition, drawing on Miller’s (1995: 49) argument 
that people of same nationality have special obligations to fellow nationals, which they 
do not have to other human beings, I assume that the audience cost the government 
incurs when its choice of action causes a high number of own casualties is by far the 
greatest. 
 
The game structure and payoffs for the Taliban and ISAF are shown in Figure 4.1.85 
All benefits and costs use the status quo as a reference point, and thus both the Taliban 
and ISAF obtain a payoff of zero in case the Taliban does not violate the peace. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
84 The assumption is based on the following premises: 1) To be able to fight a war, a democratic country needs 
popular support; own casualties undermine popular support. 2) To be able to win against the insurgency, it is 
vital to have indigenous popular support; civilian casualties undermine indigenous popular support.  
85 As stated in 4.1, the model in this thesis keeps the structure of the Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz model on imposed 
economic sanctions; however I introduce some important differences regarding the payoffs. In contrast to their 
model, I assume that: 
1. The violation benefit is not incurred regardless of the strategy the coercer chooses as long as the player 
who benefits from the violation does not yield; 
2. I distinguish between direct and indirect violation cost. The coercer continues to suffer a direct violation 
cost after the player that has caused the cost yields to coercion;  
3. Every action of choice the coercer uses has inherent audience costs as long as the other player does not 
yield. 
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Figure 4.1:  A Model of Coercive Spoiler Management 
Model adapted from Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz (2005: 491) 
   
 
    Taliban 
             
  Not violate          Violate 
       ISAF    
      
     Minimum  
     response 
                    Enemy  Population-centred strategy
                      centred  
                         strategy 
 
            
   Not    yield                      Not           yield 
        yield     yield 
 
 
 Taliban: 0   B  B - MTE    -αMTE  - MTP  -βMTP 
  ISAF:  0  -C – AIMR     -C – MIE– AIE        -Ci – αMIE      -C – MIP – AIP     -Ci   –βMIP 
      
 
Key: 
B = violation benefit to the Taliban if it violates the peace (and does not yield afterwards) 
C = violation cost incurred by ISAF if the Taliban violates the peace and does not yield afterwards 
Ci = violation cost incurred by ISAF if the Taliban violates the peace and yields afterwards 
Mjt = military cost incurred by party j if military action is of type t (j = T,I; t = P, E) 
Ajt = audience cost incurred by ISAF if it takes action t after the Taliban has violated the peace 
(t =MR, P,E) 
 
α, β = constants (0 < (α, β) < 1) 
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4.4. Preferences over Outcomes: the Taliban  
The objective of this section is to explicitly state and discuss the assumptions 
regarding the Taliban’s preferences over outcomes.   
The best possible outcome for the Taliban is the one in which the Taliban violates the 
peace and ISAF chooses the minimum response, allowing the Taliban to obtain the 
payoff B and benefit from the violation. Recall that the model assumes that the Taliban 
is prepared to stand firm if ISAF opts for the enemy-centred strategy but it will yield 
in case ISAF implements the population-centred strategy, implying that MTE  (1 – α) <  
B<  MTP  (1– β). This entails that: 
(1)  The benefits the Taliban derives from violating the peace outweigh the costs 
 it incurs when ISAF implements the enemy-centred strategy, and 
(2)  The Taliban derives no violation benefit in case ISAF implements the 
 population-centred strategy so that the insurgency loses its raison d’être.   
 
Assumption (1) implies that the Taliban considers the threat of force imminent in the 
enemy-centred strategy to be insufficiently severe. Recall that the potency of a threat 
depends on i) the magnitude of a threatened punishment and ii) the character of 
demands made by the threatener (Hovi 1998: 15). The enemy-centred strategy, 
especially the use of close air support in military offensives, may have a devastating 
effect on the insurgents.86 However, the guerrilla fighters can reduce the magnitude of 
a punishment by leaving the area of operation (taking refuge in the mountains or 
across the border in Pakistan) or by blending themselves with the civilian population. 
In addition, they exploit weaknesses of the enemy-centred strategy, such as collateral                                                         
86 For example, as a consequence of OEF military campaign in 2001, which heavily relied on air strikes, 8,000 to 
12,000 Taliban were allegedly killed, approximately 20 per cent of the entire force. In addition, 7,000 were taken 
prisoners. Assuming at least two wounded for every person killed, it is calculated that the Taliban could have 
lost half their initial strength, which is, according to O’Hanlon (2002: 55), a point at which most armies start to 
crumble. 
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damage, to win the support of the population. Furthermore, noncompliance offers 
some benefits to the Taliban, such as war economy, local power holding etc. 
Therefore, the benefits of the violation seem to be greater than the costs incurred when 
ISAF effectuates its threat of force through the enemy-centred strategy, especially in 
the context where compliance with the peace does not offer any positive incentive for 
the Taliban leadership, only the exclusion from power and prosecution. 
In contrast, if ISAF implements the population-centred strategy, the Taliban is not 
assumed to derive any benefit from spoiling the peace. Assume that ISAF, in offensive 
operations, applies force in a way that does not create grievances the Taliban exploits 
to recruit its rank and file. Further assume that ISAF establishes security forces bases 
among the population and thus creates a secure environment that makes it possible for 
a local government to function, and for international civilian actors to build capacities 
for the provision of essential services, good governance and economic development. 
Then, it is plausible to assume that, over time, the Taliban will lose popular support 
and thereby intelligence, logistics and replacement sources. The movement is assumed 
to lose its raison d’être. On the basis of the above, the Taliban is assumed to prefer to 
yield in case ISAF commits to the population-centred approach.87 
 
Having discussed the model with regard to the sequence of decisions, the payoffs, as 
well as the Taliban’s preferences over outcomes, I proceed with analyses under 
different assumptions regarding the nature of the information available to the players. 
In the next section I analyze the game under the assumption of complete information. 
 
4.5. Equilibria Under Complete Information 
The objective of this section is to examine the conditions under which a threat and use 
of force may work given complete information. The Taliban is thus assumed to know 
                                                        
87 Regarding the use of the term ‘yield’, see footnote 79. 
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(with certainty) ISAF’s set of strategies and payoffs. Given this assumption, I turn to 
the game’s equilibria.  
Under the assumption that 
(1) AIMR < MIE + AIE, and 
 C + AIMR < βMIP + Ci , where (C – Ci = R), i.e. 
(2) AIMR < (βMIP– R), 
 
that is, if AIMR < Min [(MIE + AIE), (βMIP– R)], then ISAF will apply the minimum 
response if the Taliban violates the peace. Recall that the model assumes that AIP > AIE 
> AIMR > 0, therefore condition (1) is always fulfilled. Since condition (1) is inherent in 
the model, ISAF prefers to apply the minimum response to the enemy-centred 
strategy. This is explained by the following: as neither of the two options will induce 
the Taliban to yield, it is rational for ISAF to opt for the minimum response rather than 
for the enemy-centred strategy because the aggregate cost of the minimum response 
(which consists of audience cost) does not exceed the aggregate cost of applying the 
enemy-centred strategy (which consists of higher audience costs plus military costs). 
If condition (2) holds, ISAF will prefer to apply the minimum response to applying the 
population-centred strategy. The population-centred strategy is assumed to induce the 
Taliban to yield, but its application requires enormous military costs (manpower, time 
and resources) for ISAF until the Taliban yields; in addition ISAF suffers the violation 
cost Ci  (the violation cost (C) excluding the cost of damaged reputation (R)). 
Therefore, the minimum response will be ISAF’s best option if (i) military costs of the 
population-centred strategy are substantial and (ii) the incurred violation cost is not 
significant. 
 
If it is common knowledge that ISAF’s payoffs satisfy conditions (1) and (2), (that is, 
if it common knowledge that ISAF’s threat of force is insufficiently severe and empty 
respectively), then the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is that the Taliban 
violates the peace and ISAF opts for the minimum response. 
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  If 
 AIE + MIE < βMIP – (C – Ci), where (C – Ci = R), i.e. 
(3)  AIE + MIE < βMIP – R, 
 
then ISAF will apply the enemy-centred strategy rather than the population-centred 
strategy in case the Taliban violates the peace. The enemy-centred strategy would be a 
preferred option when (i) the military costs of the enemy-centred strategy are small 
and (ii) the population-centred strategy entails large costs.  Given the assumption B > 
MTE , the Taliban will prefer to violate the peace; however, because B > MTE (1+ β), 
the Taliban would not yield.  
 
Thus, if it is common knowledge that condition (3) holds (that is, if it is common 
knowledge that ISAF’s threat of force is not sufficiently severe), the game’s subgame 
perfect equilibrium is that the Taliban violates the peace, ISAF applies the enemy-
centred strategy and the Taliban does not yield.   
 
 Finally, if 
 C > Ci + βMIP – AIMR, i.e  
(4)  R > βMIP – AIMR, and 
 C > Ci+ βMIP – MIE – AIE , i.e.  
(5)  R > βMIP – (MIE + AIE), 
 
ISAF’s best response is to apply the population-centred strategy if the Taliban violates 
the peace. If condition (4) holds, then ISAF prefers to apply the population-centred 
strategy rather than opting for the minimum response. If condition (5) holds, then 
ISAF prefers the population-centred strategy to the enemy-centred strategy. The 
population-centred strategy is the best option for ISAF in case (i) the cost of damaged 
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reputation is significant; and (ii) the military cost of applying the enemy-centred 
strategy would be almost as high as the implementation of the population-centred 
strategy. 
 
If conditions (4) and (5) hold, then ISAF would apply the population-centred strategy 
if the Taliban violates the peace. Recall that the model assumes that the Taliban is 
prepared to stand firm if ISAF opts for the enemy-centred strategy but it will yield in 
case ISAF implements the population-centred strategy. On the basis of this 
assumption, and given complete information, it follows that the Taliban, foreseeing 
that ISAF’s threat of force is both credible and potent, would not disrupt the peace 
because B < (1-β) MTP< MTP.  
 
If it is common knowledge that conditions (4) and (5) hold (if it is common knowledge 
that ISAF’s threat of force is both credible and potent) the game’s subgame perfect 
equilibrium is that the Taliban does not violate the peace, anticipating that 
NATO/ISAF would apply the population-centred strategy, that is, that ISAF would opt 
for a comprehensive and properly resourced COIN campaign. 
 
The model demonstrates that with complete information force cannot work. The threat 
of force might successfully deter the Taliban from violating the peace (if conditions 4 
and 5 are fulfilled). That is, if ISAF credibly demonstrates its commitment to the 
population-centred strategy, the Taliban will not violate the peace in the first place. In 
contrast, if ISAF is not able to convince the Taliban of its commitment to the 
population-centred strategy, the threat of force will fail to deter the Taliban from 
violating the peace. When the threat of force has proved ineffective, the actual use of 
force will be equally ineffective: ISAF chooses either the minimum response (if 
conditions 1 and 2 hold) or the enemy-centred strategy (if condition 3 holds) that 
cannot induce the Taliban to yield and the belligerents end in a stalemate.  
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4.6. Implications 
Given this conclusion it is plausible to assume that the resurgence of the insurgency 
might not have occurred if ISAF had been able to credibly demonstrate its 
commitment to the population-centred strategy. Note that in the early stages of 
international engagement in Afghanistan, in the aftermath of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the security situation was tolerable. In 2002/3 the Taliban posed no serious 
threat (Traavik 2009 [interview]). The situation started to deteriorate in the second half 
of 2003. “In retrospect, 2005 appears as a watershed in the development of the 
insurgency” (Suhrke 2008: 219). Therefore, if the commitment of security actors to the 
population-centred approach had been undisputed in the early stages of the 
international engagement, the model predicts that the insurgency movement would not 
have gained the strength it has today.  
 
However, neither ISAF nor the US-led Coalition managed to demonstrate credible 
commitment to the population-centred approach. Despite public announcements, it 
was common knowledge that the international community was not willing to bear the 
high cost of a comprehensive and properly resourced counterinsurgency campaign. 
The United States started neglecting Afghanistan as its focus on Iraq increased, while 
many NATO member states, faced with high audience costs of AIP type, have been 
reluctant to commit combat troops. The lack of troops and risk-averse operational 
culture indicated a lack of commitment. Given common knowledge that the 
promise/threat88 of the population-centred approach was not credible, the Taliban 
resorted to violence to undermine the peace process from which it was excluded.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
In order to examine the conditions under which the threat and use of force may be 
effective, I presented a game-theoretic model and analyzed it under the assumption of 
complete information. I recapitulate here the equilibrium results of this analysis.                                                         
88 The threat to the Taliban, but the promise to the population. 
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The Taliban will only violate the peace if the benefits associated with the violation 
exceed the costs. Under the assumption of complete information, this means that the 
Taliban will violate the peace if ISAF is not prepared to respond with a comprehensive 
and properly resourced counterinsurgency campaign (also referred to as the 
population-centred strategy in this thesis). If ISAF can credibly demonstrate its 
commitment to use force within a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach, the 
Taliban will effectively be deterred from violating the peace. This is because the 
Taliban, foreseeing that ISAF is committed to the population-centred strategy, will not 
violate the peace because peace violation will not lead to any benefits in case ISAF 
responds with the population-centred strategy. 
 
Conversely, if the Taliban observes that ISAF is prepared to respond with (a) a 
minimum response or (b) the enemy-centred strategy, the Taliban will violate the 
peace because the benefits of the violation exceed the cost of noncompliance. In other 
words, the Taliban considers the threat of force imminent in the minimum response 
and the enemy-centred strategy to be insufficiently severe. Furthermore, when the 
threats of force prove ineffective, the actual use of force will also fail in compelling 
the Taliban to abide by the peace agreement.  
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5. The Coercion Game Under Incomplete 
Information  
The previous chapter concludes that force, if it works at all, works at the threat stage. 
But can force work after the threat of force has failed and force has actually been 
used? The literature on economic sanctions demonstrates that coercion might work 
after the threat has actually been executed under the condition that (i) noncompliance 
was based on misperception and (ii) that misperception was corrected after coercion 
has been used (Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz 2005). Misperception is related to the threat 
assessment (the potency, credibility and contingency aspect).  
 
In this chapter I examine this proposition by analyzing the model presented in Chapter 
4 under the assumption of incomplete information. Put simple, I assume that the 
Taliban does not know with certainty how ISAF will respond to a peace violation. 
How does this uncertainty affect the outcome of the interaction? 
 
5.1. Defining the Type of ISAF 
I assume that the Taliban does not know what kind of opponent it is facing when the 
game begins. ISAF may be one of three possible types: weak (meaning that conditions 
1 and 2 hold), casualty-shy (that is, condition 3 holds) or committed (conditions 4 and 
5 hold). I further assume that the Taliban believes ISAF to be committed with 
probability p, casualty-shy with probability q, and weak with probability 1– p – q, 
where p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, and p + q ≤ 1.89 This is modelled by letting “Nature” make the first 
move in the game. This is a random move, which decides ISAF’s type with the 
probabilities stated above. ISAF is assumed to be able to observe Nature’s move, i.e. it 
knows its own type. In contrast, the Taliban cannot observe Nature’s move, i.e. it does 
not know ISAF’s type when the game begins, but it may learn its type by observing 
how ISAF behaves in the game.  However, the Taliban knows the payoffs for each 
                                                        
89 In games of incomplete information, p and q are assumed to be common knowledge. 
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type of ISAF and therefore expects that violating the peace would cause ISAF to 
respond minimally if it is weak, to use the enemy-centred strategy if it is casualty-shy, 
and the population-centred strategy if it is a committed actor. 
I proceed to determine the equilibria of the coercion game under incomplete 
information. 
 
5.2. Equilibria under Incomplete Information 
If the Taliban violates the peace, its expected payoff is p(–βMTP) + q (B – MTE) + (1– 
p – q) B = B (1 – p) – pβMTP – qMTE. On the other hand, if the Taliban does not violate 
the peace, it receives with certainty a payoff of 0. This means that it is rational for the 
Taliban to violate the peace only if the expected payoff of violating peace is higher 
than 0 (the payoff it receives in case it does not violate the peace), that is 
 
  p(–βMTP) + q (B – MTE) + (1– p – q) B > 0 
  –p(βMTP + B) + B – qMTE  > 0 
  –p(βMTP + B) > qMTE – B 
 
On the basis of the abovementioned, I conclude that it is in the Taliban’s best interest 
not to violate the peace when the probability p for ISAF to be a committed actor is 
   
  
 
(6)    
€ 
p > B − qMT
βMTP + B
E   
 
 
 
In contrast, if  
 
(7)      
€ 
p < B − qMT
βMTP + B
E  
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it is rational for the Taliban to violate the peace.  
 
If condition (6) holds, the game has a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which 
the Taliban does not violate the peace and the game immediately ends. ISAF has no 
opportunity to make a move and thus its strategic type is not revealed by the course of 
the game.  
 
When condition (7) holds, the game has a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in 
which the Taliban violates the peace. How the game will develop depends on ISAF’s 
type. If ISAF is weak, it will respond minimally. If ISAF is casualty-shy, it will use 
the enemy-centred strategy. And if ISAF is committed to Afghanistan, it will use the 
population-centred strategy. By opting for one of the three possible strategies, ISAF 
will reveal its type. If ISAF uses the population-centred strategy, the Taliban will 
yield, otherwise it will persist to oppose the peace. In conclusion, this equilibrium 
demonstrates that the use of force might work, but only under specific conditions. For 
the use of force to be effective, ISAF must be a committed actor and implement the 
population-centred strategy.  
 
Which of the two equilibria appears to be more plausible? For the pooling equilibrium 
to be likely the Taliban should be sufficiently convinced that ISAF is prepared to 
commit itself to the population-centred strategy. That is, the threat of the population-
centred approach will be effective to the extent the Taliban attaches high probability p 
to ISAF being committed actor. Taking into consideration that ISAF is perceived to 
have incentives to go back on the population-centred strategy (see 5.4.1), I assume p to 
be rather small, the pooling equilibrium less plausible, and consequently the separating 
equilibrium more likely.  
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5.3. Updating Beliefs with Bayes’ Rule 
After ISAF’s move, the Taliban may revise its perception of ISAF’s type, i.e. it may 
update its prior belief of its opponent type in the light of new information. The Taliban 
acquires the new information by observing ISAF’s behaviour during the course of the 
game; specifically what strategy ISAF applies after the Taliban has disrupted the peace 
(whether it will opt for the minimum response, the enemy-centred strategy or the 
population-centred strategy).  If, for example, ISAF implements the population-
centred strategy, the Taliban updates the probability distribution of ISAF’s possible 
types so that the posterior probabilities become p = 1, q = 0, 1 – p – q = 0. 
 
The updating of prior beliefs on the basis of new information is possible by applying 
Bayes’ rule, hence the Bayesian updating. Bayes’ rule states the relationship between a 
set of conditional probabilities.  
  
  
€ 
P(A /B) = P(B / A) ⋅ P(A)
P(B / A) ⋅ P(A) + P(B / ˆ A ) ⋅ P( ˆ A )     
 
P(A / B) = posterior probability of A, given B 
P(B / A) = probability of B, given A 
P(B  / Â) = probability for B; given not-A 
P(A) = prior probability of A  
P(Â) = prior probability of not-A  
B = the new evidence 
 
I now apply Bayes’ rule to update the Taliban’s prior belief of ISAF after ISAF’s 
move. I first examine the case where  
 
 (6)  
€ 
p > B − qMT
βMTP + B
E
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A, Â and B are here defined as follows: 
 A = ISAF is committed  
 Â = ISAF is casualty-shy 
 Á = ISAF is weak 
 B = ISAF applies the population-centred strategy 
 
 
When the game has a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it follows that 
 P(B / A) = 0 
 P(B / Â) = 0 
 P(B / Á) = 0 
 
because ISAF does not get to make the move, as the Taliban does not disrupt the 
peace. Furthermore I have assumed that 
 P (A) = p 
 P (Â) = q 
 P (Á) = 1-p-q. 
 
The application of the Bayes’ rule gives the following result: 
 
€ 
P(A /B) =
€ 
P(B / A) ⋅ P(A)
P(B / A) ⋅ P(A) + P(B / ˆ A ) ⋅ P( ˆ A ) + P( ˜ A ) ⋅ P(B / ˜ A ) =
€ 
0 ⋅ p
0 ⋅ p + 0 ⋅ q + 0 ⋅1− p − q =
0
0    
  
The result is undefined, which implies that Bayes’ rule cannot be applied in this 
instance to update the Taliban’s prior belief of ISAF’s type. As ISAF does not get to 
make a move, the Taliban cannot observe its behaviour in the game and update its 
estimate of probability. However, it is reasonable to assume that in this instance the 
Taliban’s belief of ISAF will be the same when the game ends as it was when the 
game started. As the course of the game does not give any new information to the 
Taliban, it is likely that the Taliban will continue to believe that ISAF is committed 
with probability p. 
 
  76 
I now examine the case where 
 
 (7)     
€ 
p < B − qMT
βMTP + B
E  
 
 
This is a game with a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As a result of the 
strategy ISAF has chosen to pursue, it follows that  
 P(B / A) = 1 
 P(B / Â) = 0 
 P(B / Á) = 0. 
 
Furthermore, I have assumed that  
 P (A) = p 
 P (Â) = q 
 P (Á) = 1-p-q 
 
The application of the Bayes’ rule gives the following result: 
 
 
€ 
P(A /B) =
€ 
P(B / A) ⋅ P(A)
P(B / A) ⋅ P(A) + P(B / ˆ A ) ⋅ P( ˆ A ) + P( ˜ A ) ⋅ P(B / ˜ A ) =
€ 
1 ⋅ p
1 ⋅ p + 0 ⋅ q+ 0 ⋅1− p − q =
p
p = 1 
 
 
Given that ISAF uses the population-centred strategy, it follows (in this equilibrium) 
that ISAF is a committed actor. Thus,  
 
- if ISAF uses the population-centred strategy, the posterior probability 
distribution becomes (p = 1, q = 0, 1– p – q =0); 
- if ISAF uses the enemy-centred strategy, the posterior probability distribution 
becomes (p = 0, q = 1, 1– p – q = 0); 
- if ISAF uses the minimum response, the posterior probability distribution 
becomes (p = 0, q = 0, 1– p – q = 1). 
 
  77 
5.4. Findings and implications 
In order to examine the conditions under which the use of force may work after the 
threat has been executed I analyzed the model presented in Chapter 4 under the 
assumption of incomplete information. I recapitulate here the equilibrium results of 
this analysis. 
 
Under incomplete information, the threat of force may be effective provided that the 
Taliban and the population are sufficiently convinced that ISAF is committed to a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Deterrence from violation is the best 
possible outcome for ISAF; therefore, it is in ISAF’s best interest, regardless of its 
type, to make efforts to convince the population and the opponent of its commitment.  
 
Regarding the actual use of force, the model, analyzed under the assumption of 
incomplete information, predicts that force might work provided that the Taliban 
violated the peace acting on an erroneous belief that ISAF was not a committed actor. 
If the Taliban learns from ISAF’s response that its calculation was mistaken due to the 
private information, the Taliban might reconsider its action of choice and yield. 
Therefore for force to work ISAF must convince the Taliban of its commitment.  
 
5.4.1. Implications 
The model identifies the issue of credibility of ISAF’s commitment as crucial for the 
outcome of the counterinsurgency. For the threat of force to deter the Taliban from 
spoiling the peace, or the use of force to compel the Taliban to yield, one of two 
following conditions must be fulfilled: 1) the Taliban must know with certainty that 
ISAF is committed to the population-centred strategy, or 2) the Taliban must be 
sufficiently convinced that ISAF has such commitment. In other words, ISAF’s 
commitment must be credible, in the sense that the Taliban places sufficiently high 
probability that ISAF, in case the Taliban acts as a spoiler, will respond with a 
comprehensive and properly resourced counterinsurgency campaign.   
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A credibility problem arises since ISAF is perceived to have an incentive to renege on 
its commitment to the population-centred strategy because the proper implementation 
is complex, lengthy and extremely costly. 90 In that context, ISAF is expected to have a 
particular challenge to maintain public support for protracted deployment of resources 
due to the ‘guns or butter dilemma’, especially when domestic constituencies do not 
perceive the insurgency as directly threatening nation’s security (Mack 1975: 186). 
The option of bluffing commitment is unfeasible due to, at least two issues: first, 
“when man’s life is at stake, it takes more than propaganda to budge him” (Galula 
1964: 78); second, the contemporary media coverage reveals it (Hovi 1998: 32). 
Media expose the lack of political will and public support for a sustained and properly 
resourced counterinsurgency campaign, as well as what happens on the battlefield. 
How can ISAF then make its commitment more credible? There are several strategic 
moves an actor can employ to raise the credibility of its commitment and thereby the 
probability to succeed (Hovi 1998: 32).91 With respect to ISAF’s commitment in 
Afghanistan, I discuss two following possibilities: 
1. Eliminating options 
2. Substitution 
Using the former technique ISAF demonstrates that other options, i.e. the minimum 
response and the enemy-centred strategy are eliminated. This can be communicated by 
costly signals such as committing necessary resources to the theatre, and establishing 
security bases among the population. By doing so, the audience costs of the minimum 
response increase substantially, and thus minimum response ceases to be a viable 
alternative. Similarly, home constituencies will not tolerate the enemy-centred 
approach once they have “authorised” the population-centred strategy by supporting 
                                                        
90 The model assumes that the Taliban will yield if ISAF implements properly the population-centred strategy. In 
real life, success is not guaranteed – every strategy entails risk.  
91 For an overview and discussion on different techniques which may improve the credibility of threats see 
Chapter 3 in Hovi (1998).   
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the deployment of enormous resources to the distant theatre. In this way ISAF is 
expected to significantly increase the credibility of its commitment. 
 
Using the latter techniques, ISAF might replace the population-centred strategy with 
another strategy that is more limited in scope. In this respect, I consider two 
possibilities:  
 
1. The area of implementation of the population-centred strategy is limited to the 
most threatened and most populated areas.92 (This technique is already 
recommended in COMISAF’s Initial Assessment: 2009: 2-19.) In that way, the 
costs of implementation are reduced and thereby the incentive to renege on the 
commitment is also reduced. 
 
2. The scope of the implementation is limited to one segment only: the training of 
indigenous forces to fight the insurgency on their own. In this way the cost and 
length of commitment may be significantly reduced and thereby the 
commitment appears more credible. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that raising commitment is costly. In this context, the 
first alternative – eliminating options – is extremely costly. Taking into consideration 
that the costs are immediate whereas benefits uncertain, it is important for ISAF to 
ensure that the cost of commitment is not greater than the benefits incurred by 
defeating the insurgency (Hovi 1998: 51). 
 
 
                                                         
92 This strategy is expected to have negative effects – the insurgents are expected to relocate their operations. 
However, the relocation from the traditional area of operation weakens the insurgents because they may lose 
physical and political sanctuary; in addition they incur the cost of migration, renewed recruiting, and re-
establishing a stronghold (COMISAF’s Initial Assessment: 2009: 2-19).  
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6. Conclusion  
The established military doctrine postulates that an insurgency cannot be defeated by 
conventional military operations that target the enemy’s armed forces and advocate the 
so-called population-centred approach because the support of a civilian population is 
crucial in determining the outcome of a counterinsurgency. Empirical studies on 
Afghanistan confirm the limitations of the traditional military approach. With this as 
my point of departure, I set out to explore why international security actors, in 
particular the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), have failed 
to defeat the insurgents in Afghanistan. More specifically, I set out to examine the 
conditions under which the threat and use of force might work against the Taliban-led 
insurgency in Afghanistan. For this purpose, I developed a game-theoretic model and 
analyzed it under different assumptions regarding the information available to the 
belligerents. In this chapter I present the main findings. 
Underlying the model are the following two assumptions: (1) the Taliban will violate 
the peace only if the expected benefits of the violation exceed the expected costs; and 
(2) the Taliban’s incentive to violate the peace is curbed only when ISAF conducts a 
comprehensive and properly resourced counterinsurgency campaign (referred to in this 
thesis as the population-centred strategy). Given complete information, the model 
predicts, that a threat of force will effectively deter the Taliban from violating the 
peace if the Taliban knows that ISAF is committed to implementation of the 
population-centred strategy. Given incomplete information, the model predicts that the 
threat of force will effectively deter the Taliban from spoiler behaviour provided that 
the Taliban is sufficiently convinced that ISAF is prepared to implement the 
population-centred strategy.  
As long as ISAF is not able to credibly demonstrate its commitment to a properly 
resourced, comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, the Taliban, foreseeing that 
the threat is not credible, will act as a spoiler. Under complete information, when the 
threat of force has proved ineffective in deterring the Taliban from violating the peace 
the actual use of force will be equally ineffective. This is because the Taliban will only 
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defy ISAF’s threat of force if this threat is insufficiently severe. Taking into 
consideration the character of the demands that is asked from the Taliban, the 
magnitude of the punishment ISAF inflicts on the Taliban when ISAF (i) simply 
defends itself (referred to as the minimum response in this thesis) or (ii) employs the 
enemy-centred approach does not exceed the positive effects of noncompliance.  
However, under incomplete information, the model predicts that the use of force might 
be effective in curbing the Taliban’s incentive to act as a spoiler. Specifically, the use 
of force against the Taliban might work if the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) 
the Taliban violates the peace because it erroneously believes that ISAF is not 
committed to the population-centred strategy; (2) ISAF in its response demonstrates 
credibly its commitment to the population-centred strategy; and (3) the Taliban 
corrects its belief about ISAF. In conclusion, the Taliban will cease to pose a threat to 
the peace process only if it is reassured that ISAF is a committed actor.  
How do these findings contribute to the existing literature on the counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan? First, the model clarifies why the military approach, which I refer to as 
the enemy-centred strategy, has not been effective against the Taliban. Second, the 
model suggests that the credibility of ISAF’s commitment is an essential element for 
the population-centred strategy to work, thereby supplementing the literature arguing 
that military force alone cannot defeat the insurgency. Concurrently, my findings 
highlight the importance of proper resourcing that is also emphasized in the previous 
research; however, this thesis contributes by finding that proper resourcing is a 
necessary, yet not sufficient, condition for demonstrating credible commitment.  
My model makes it clear that the credibility of ISAF’s commitment is crucial for the 
outcome. Given this conclusion, the model entails important implications for ISAF’s 
policy in practice. First, to end the insurgency, ISAF must convince its opponent as 
well as the population of its long-term commitment. Such commitment can be 
signalled by, first of all, a change in operational culture, deployment of necessary 
troops and resources to the theatre, and assurances about ISAF’s staying power 
(through strong public support for a protracted deployment). Such signals are costly 
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and thereby credible. Alternatively, ISAF may raise the credibility of its commitment 
by limiting the implementation of the population-centred strategy territorially (to the 
most threatened and most populated areas), or functionally (focusing on the training of 
indigenous security forces).  Finally, taking into consideration (i) the cost of 
commitment to the population-centred strategy; and (ii) the fact that success is not 
guaranteed, ISAF must, before incurring additional costs, ensure that the benefits to be 
accrued by defeating the Taliban are greater than the expected costs of credible 
commitment.   
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